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“It is a tale . . . full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”1

INTRODUCTION
Patent reform is a hotly contested issue, occupying the attention of Congress, the Supreme Court, and many of the most
innovative companies in the world.2 Most of that dispute centers
on patent enforcement, and in particular on the role of non-practicing entities (NPEs) or “patent trolls” – companies that don’t
themselves make products but sue those that do.3 To technology
companies, NPEs are a drag on innovation, taxing them tens of
billions of dollars every year while achieving no social purpose.4
To NPEs and their supporters, they are enabling the first inventor to get paid and creating a working market for the transfer of
technology.5
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act. 5, sc. 5.
2. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1256, 1260 (2009); Sannu Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers?
An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 116
(2010).
3. That is possible because, unlike most IP rights, there is no requirement
that the defendant copy the invention from the plaintiff, and indeed the vast
majority of patent suits are filed against defendants who independently developed the technology rather than copying it. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark
A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2009) (“Patent
law is virtually alone in intellectual property (“IP”) in punishing independent
development.”).
4. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014) (estimating that the direct, accrued
cost of NPE patent assertions totaled $29 billion in 2011); Mark A. Lemley et
al., The Patent Enforcement Iceberg, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (estimating that the total cost of patent assertions to assertion recipients in 2015
was between $77.7 billion and $122.2 billion). For a criticism of the Bessen
study, see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014); see also
Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 649, 650–52 (2014). For an analysis that covers the total social cost of
patent trolls, see James E. Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls 20, 32 tbl.3 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011) (estimating an aggregate cost of patent trolls around $500 billion, where most of
this value is social loss, and little is transferred to inventors).
5. James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
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Which is it? Over the past several years, we have sought to
answer this question. We began by modeling as a matter of economic theory the circumstances under which patent enforcement
contributes to society.6 We then conducted a pilot survey, asking
IP licensing lawyers at companies about their experiences with
patent enforcement and the effects of patent licensing demands
on subsequent innovation.7 The results were not encouraging;
very few patent licensing demands seemed to be associated with
any indicia of innovation or legitimate technology transfer.8 But
the pilot study was also preliminary, and may well have been
skewed by the focus on professionals who deal with patent lawsuits licensing demands on a daily basis.
In this paper, we turn that pilot study into a full analysis of
the effect of patent licensing demands on the economy. With the
help of a National Science Foundation grant and experts in survey design, we sent our survey out to every US-based business
with at least one employee and revenue of $1 million or more—
over 45,000 companies. Our results provide important insights
into the nature and limits of patent licensing demands and their
role (or lack thereof) in driving innovation.
First, our full survey of U.S. businesses validates and extends our initial result that NPE licensing demands almost
never lead to innovation by the target firm. None of the indicia
we would expect of real technology transfer were common in patent licensing demands. Moreover, NPE demands were particularly unlikely to be accompanied by the sharing of know-how or
employees, the creation of joint ventures, or the development of
new products.
Second, NPEs do not seem to be a monolithic group. The results for certain types of NPEs were more promising. Federal
labs that assert patents are the group most likely to transfer
knowledge or drive new products when they license patents. Interestingly, those labs are the ones that depend least on patents
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56
EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL
L. REV. 457, 459 (2012); see also Shrestha, supra note 2, at 115–16.
6. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Patent Licensing,
Technology Transfer, and Innovation, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 188 (2016) [hereinafter Lemley & Feldman, Patent Licensing]; see also Mark A. Lemley & Robin
C. Feldman, Essay, Is Patent Enforcement Efficient?, 98 B.U. L. REV. 649, 651
(2018) [hereinafter Lemley & Feldman, Efficient].
7. See generally Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing
Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015).
8. Id. at 139.
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themselves as drivers of licensing.9 The results for universities
are more mixed. University patent demands are more likely to
drive innovation than demands by other sorts of NPEs, but most
of them still don’t involve any indicia of technology transfer.
That is consistent with the hybrid role university patenting
plays. Sometimes university patents are in fact responsible for
spinning new technologies out to the private sector. But at other
times universities act as patent trolls, not disseminating new inventions but merely suing those who develop those inventions
independently.10
Third, our results confirm prior literature finding that the
patent system works differently in different industries.11 Patent
licensing demands almost never result in technology transfer or
new innovation in the computer industry, particularly when
NPEs are doing the asserting. They are somewhat more likely to
9. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Reinventing Public R&D: Patent Policy
and the Commercialization of National Laboratory Technologies, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 167, 168 (2001); see Albert N. Link et al., Public Science and Public Innovation: Assessing the Relationship Between Patenting at U.S. National Laboratories and the Bayh-Dole Act, 40 RES. POL’Y 1094, 1095 (2011) (explaining that
research universities are more market focused and driven to commercialize intellectual property than national labs).
10. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611 (2008).
11. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 37–65 (2009) [hereinafter BURK & LEMLEY]; WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) (discussing that the drug industry provides the
strongest case for patents in their present form); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156
(2002) (determining that our seemingly unitary patent system actually varies
by industry); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003) (finding that technology “displays highly diverse
characteristics across different sectors” and that the patent system operates differently in these industries); Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parsimony Principle, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 1694–95 (2010); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1326 (2009); Amy Kapczynski et
al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1044–45 (2005) (“Many who
accept [the notion that strong patent protection reduces social welfare] nonetheless consider the pharmaceutical sector an exception.”); Lisa Larrimore
Ouelette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 299, 300 (2010) (“The pharmaceutical industry is the poster child for a
strong patent system.”); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119,
119 (2000); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92
TEX. L. REV. 517, 523–25 (2014).
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be productive in the life sciences, but the industry variation we
observe doesn’t map neatly to the traditional life sciences versus
computer divide that has dominated the last decades of patent
reform debates.12 Instead, it is areas like energy that see the
most new products resulting from patent assertions. That suggests both that patent policy experts need to acknowledge the
reality of industry differences, and that we need to look beyond
the one-dimensional debate between computer and life sciences
firms, just as we need to look beyond the single dimension of operating companies versus NPEs.
Fourth, when we asked firms about the licensing of their
own patents rather than licensing patents from others, we got a
somewhat different story. Companies think their own patents
drive innovation by others somewhat more than they think others’ patents drive their own innovation. While it is possible that
the firms we surveyed happened to transfer a lot of technology
out with their patents while taking in very little from other
firms’ patents, we suspect that the survey responses show some
bias. This could be bias in either direction. The data doesn’t tell
us, though we think the most likely explanation is optimism
bias: patentees think they are generating more innovation than
licensees think they are, and licensees in turn think their own
contributions are more important. Whichever way the skew cuts,
this result also helps explain the very different perceptions of the
patent system by patentees and defendants. They really do seem
to see their contributions to the world differently.
Finally, and perhaps most important in the long run, a significant majority of respondents simply didn’t face patent licensing demands at all. It is true that those companies may be
smaller and less innovative than the ones that do face licensing
demands. But given the raging debates over the patent system
and its role in driving the economy, it is important to recognize

12. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 11, at 38–41; Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691,
706 (2004) (juxtaposing biotechnology and information technology (IT) patent
cases); Graham et al., supra note 11, at 1268 (“Given the extensive writing,
opinion, and theory about the differences in innovation and patenting characteristics between the life sciences and information technologies firms, we focused primarily on companies in the biotechnology and software industries.”);
Sichelman, supra note 11, at 523–24 (noting that while “the costs of invention
and commercialization in the software industry are far below those in the pharmaceutical industry,” the “duration of software and pharmaceutical patents are
exactly the same” and “the scope of software patents often exceeds the scope of
pharmaceutical patents”).
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that there are large swaths of American businesses that simply
don’t deal with patent licensing demands at all.
To be clear, nothing in our data suggests that the patent
system as a whole doesn’t matter or isn’t working. Patent acquisition and patent licensing remain important parts of the innovation ecosystem. And patent enforcement too can promote innovation by giving operating companies exclusivity. But our
study does belie claims that the patent enforcement system is itself a driver of innovation. It isn’t.
In Part I we discuss the debate over the role of NPEs and
prior work on patent enforcement by NPEs. In Part II we explain
our methodology. We present our results in Part III and discuss
some implications of those results in Part IV.
I. PATENT ENFORCEMENT AND INNOVATION
A. THE DEBATE OVER NPES13
The role of NPEs (aka patent trolls or “patent assertion entities” (PAEs)) is central to the debate over patent reform.14
Roughly half of the patent suits filed in the last few years have
been filed by trolls.15 In some industries, notably computers and
telecommunications, the percentage is much higher.16 NPEs are

13. Portions of Part I.A are adapted from our pilot study.
14. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for
the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118–21 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Cotropia et al., supra note 4, at 651–52; Sara Jeruss, Robin
Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2013).
See generally Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers (Santa Clara Univ.
Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 08-13, 2013). The measurement is
complicated not only by different definitions of patent trolls, but by the fact that
until September of 2011 a party could file suit against multiple defendants in a
single case. Patent trolls tend to sue far more defendants than practicing entities, often suing dozens at the same time. So, studies before 2011 of lawsuits
filed—as opposed to the number of defendants sued—produced a misleadingly
low measure of troll activity. Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz, using a restrictive
definition of a patent troll, still find that roughly half of the assertions in both
2010 and 2012 were made by NPEs, though in 2010 many of those assertions
were bundled into a single suit. Cotropia et al., supra note 4, at 655, 662, 687,
692–96.
16. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among
Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 691–92 (2011). Allison, Lemley, and
Schwartz completed a comprehensive study of how case outcomes differ between
trolls and practicing entities. See generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley &
David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits?,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237 (2017).
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controversial because they do not make products themselves.17
As a result, patent enforcement by NPEs represents a tax on innovation because they file costly lawsuits and obtain substantial
settlements from other innovative companies.18 Courts, Congress, and private organizations have sought to cut back on problematic lawsuits by NPEs.19 Many of these efforts have been
driven by concerns about the harm to innovation done by patent
trolls.20
We know that actual technology transfer happens within
the patent system in the ex ante context.21 Both practicing entities and some NPEs engage in ex ante technology transfer. In
particular, universities and inventors create alliances with companies that can more easily develop and commercialize their inventions through joint ventures and other types of technology
and research sharing agreements.22 These agreements frequently occur before a patent issues or even before any of the
parties file for a patent.23 Notably, these agreements involve
technology transfer.24 Universities and other inventors in these
deals provide new technology to those in a position to implement
17. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 4, at 651.
18. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 144–47 (2008);
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 53 (2011); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 25, 41 (2012); Charles
Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech
-giants-can-stifle-competition.html; Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread,
WALL STREET J. (July 8, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270
2303292204577514782932390996.html; This American Life: When Patents Attack!, WBEZ (July 22, 2011), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/441/when
-patents-attack.
19. See, e.g., Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Saving
High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845,
113th Cong. (2013).
20. See H.R. 845.
21. ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI & ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, MARKETS
FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
116–17 (2001). See generally Colleen V. Chien, Software Patents as a Currency,
Not Tax, on Innovation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1669 (2016) (documenting
technology transfer in many software licenses, but also a large number of software patent licenses without technology transfer). For a discussion of what we
mean by ex ante versus ex post licensing activity, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
22. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 155–56.
23. Id. at 139.
24. Id. at 155–56.
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it.25 And that technology often includes trade secrets and knowhow beyond the to-be-patented technology itself.26 Further, technology transfer can occur informally, by the communication of
information at scientific conferences, through journal articles,
and even though commitments to open sharing of patented technologies.27
Patent litigation and licensing demands for existing patents, by contrast, tend to occur well after the defendant has developed and implemented the technology. This is particularly
true of NPE patent assertions and licensing demands, which
some evidence suggests tend to happen in the last few years of a
patent’s life or even after they expire.28 NPE licensing demands
and litigation against companies that are producing products do
not seem to involve technology transfer or other indicia of new
innovation. Indeed, evidence suggests NPEs may buy patents
with vaguely worded claims that are optimized for litigation but
lacking in technical merit29 and that they may delay licensing of
patents to increase revenue by targeting successful implementers after the fact.30

25. Id.
26. Id. at 155 n.40.
27. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793 (2016) (discussing ways patents
can help diffuse knowledge).
28. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1312, 1355 (2013) (“NPEs . . . assert[ ] their patents relatively late in the patent term and frequently continue to litigate their
patents to expiration.”). But see Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded:
The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–9 (2013)
(finding from litigation data that newer patents were asserted more frequently
and that NPEs were more willing to assert patents of any age, and suggesting
that studies showing NPEs asserting relatively late in a patent’s life may reflect
historic changes during the time frame of the studies). Love agrees that his findings “could be inflated by the fact that fewer NPEs existed during the 1990s and
early 2000s when, perhaps, they might have enforced younger patents.” Love,
supra, at 1355.
29. See Josh Feng & Xavier Jaravel, Crafting Intellectual Property Rights:
Implications for Patent Assertion Entities, Litigation, and Innovation 1, 24–31
(Dec. 11, 2018) (unpublished paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2838017.
30. See Erik Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent Damages Skew
Licensing Markets, 36 REV. LITIG. 379, 405 (2017). For thoughts on how to break
the “vicious cycle of excessive, socially harmful remedies,” see William F. Lee &
A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 385 (2016).
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Patent trolls may be collecting payments on patents that are
invalid or not infringed.31 Given the economics of patent litigation, a rational company may choose to pay a “nuisance-value
settlement” and thereby avoid the costs and risks of a lawsuit.32
The patent in that case is not benefitting society at all but rather
serving as a drag on innovation.33 While that nuisance-value settlement model is clearly socially unproductive, it is also reasonable to worry that patent enforcement itself is socially costly.
Without some benefit in the form of innovation or technology
transfer, patent enforcement by NPEs seems like a pure cost to
society— one that runs to the tens of billions of dollars per year.34
Operating companies, by contrast, generally disseminate innovations directly. The traditional justification for patent enforcement—that enforcement increases the return to patented
goods by restricting competition, and therefore gives more incentive to innovate—can work for those companies. Whether it
works, and under what circumstances, is an empirical question
beyond the scope of this paper. Our point is only that operating
companies, unlike NPEs, don’t need to engage in technology
transfer to licensees to disseminate innovations; they do so directly by selling products. The traditional justifications for patents have operating companies in mind.
Defenders of patent trolls argue that they can serve as business intermediaries between inventors and commercializers.35
31. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 14, at 2126 (describing patent trolls
that generate significant revenue by licensing patents with little or no actual
litigation).
32. Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
250 (2013) (describing the phenomenon and exploring case studies); Lemley &
Melamed, supra note 14, at 2124 (noting the prevalence of this model).
33. See Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing the tax that patent trolls exact on innovation as a result of forcing companies to license patents
without providing any technical knowledge with the patent or license).
34. Supra note 4.
35. Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 306–09 (2007); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1809, 1818 (2007); McDonough, supra note 5, at 190; Kristen
Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric,
47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 451 (2014); Shrestha, supra note 2, at 118; see also Ashish
Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 470–72 (2004); Robert P.
Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477, 1519–20 (2005). For discussion of this patent market idea, see, for example, Stéphanie Chuffart-Finsterwald, Patent Markets: An Opportunity for Technology Diffusion and FRAND Licensing?, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 335
(2014) (analyzing legal opportunities presented by patent markets that enable
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The traditional theory of the patent system posits that patents
encourage innovation by allowing inventors to exclude competitors from the market, thereby earning supracompetitive returns
and recouping investment.36 A number of scholars have argued,
however, that the patent system can encourage commercialization of inventions by allowing the inventor to control who can
develop the technology.37 And if the inventor is not in a position
to commercialize the invention at all, in theory, patents can
serve as a mechanism that allows the inventor to provide her
new idea to someone who can make use of it. On this theory, patent trolls can serve an intermediation function, helping to deliver good ideas to companies who can put them to good use.38
One can think of this as the efficient middleman hypothesis—
NPEs are making a market for transactions in patents, and

technology diffusion); Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J.
ECON. PERSP. 45, 53–56 (2013); Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case
Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2014); Michael
Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2014) (discussing how “patent licensing might aid commercialization”).
36. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 319–26; Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 993–96 (1997).
37. Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1067–69 (2007); accord Michael Abramowicz & John
F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
337, 398–404 (2008); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–12 (2001); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010).
38. Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286–87
(2009) (“Troll defenders counter that trolls are socially useful intermediaries between small inventors and commercialization. Small inventors may not
have the resources to engage in detecting infringers, licensing negotiations, or
patent infringement lawsuits against infringers. By buying up patents from
small inventors, trolls may ‘spur innovation by investing in undercapitalized
projects and reducing transaction costs for small inventors who are routinely
robbed by large corporations.’”); Daniel F. Spulber, Intellectual Property and the
Theory of the Firm, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 9, 31
(F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012) (“Specialized intermediaries began
to create a market for patented technologies in the late 19th and early 20th
century . . . . This important development ‘facilitated the emergence of a group
of highly specialized and productive inventors by making it possible for them to
transfer to others responsibility for developing and commercializing their inventions.’”); B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 825, 832 (2014) (“Specialized intermediaries are especially valuable in
new or emerging markets and in instances in which asymmetries of information
and other transaction costs are significant.”).
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those patents help the world when they are put in productive
hands.39
For this theory to work, however, patent trolls must actually
facilitate the use of the patented inventions by companies who
were not otherwise using them. A patent market isn’t a good
thing in and of itself. It is desirable only if it promotes innovation
or technology transfer.40 Our study attempts to examine whether
the activity of patent trolls does facilitate the development or use
of new technology by licensees. As described below, the results
are not encouraging.41
If patent trolls do not operate as efficient middlemen, transferring new technology, perhaps they are serving the social good
as tax collectors for small inventors whose ideas have been appropriated. Under this theory, the patent holder has properly
contributed to learning and dissemination by publishing its
ideas in the form of a patent, and the product company has
simply taken the idea from the patent’s disclosure. The patent
troll, therefore, would be operating as a tax collector to facilitate
the transfer of an appropriate payment to the person who gave
the idea to the world.
Several factors cast doubt on the appropriate payment theory, however. First, much of the patent troll activity occurs in
fast-moving technologies such as computers and telecommunications, where the patent is often on a technology that bears little
resemblance to the defendant’s product.42 In these circumstances, the patent troll asserts that the patent covers any
means of solving a problem, even if the defendant’s implementation looks nothing like the patentee’s original idea.43 The distance between the patent disclosures in these cases and the accused product makes it unlikely that the company making the
product learned the idea from the patent’s disclosure. That delay
39. Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 258–59 (2007).
A separate argument is that patents serve as a currency, allowing otherwise-intangible ideas to have a realizable transaction value. See Chien, supra
note 21; Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95
TEX. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2016). But for that to be true, there must be some underlying technology transfer for which the patent serves as a marker.
40. Michael J. Burstein, Patent Markets: A Framework for Evaluation, 47
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 507, 514–20 (2015).
41. See infra Part III.
42. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 907–08 (2013).
43. Id.
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tends to be even greater when the patent is first sold to an NPE
and then asserted.44 The hypothesis also assumes a level of quality in patents and adequacy of patent disclosure that is generally
not attributed to the modern patent system by scholars and commentators.45 Finally, the evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of patent cases do not involve alleged copying, but
rather independent invention.46 If the parties taking patent licenses are doing so to avoid being sued on technology they themselves developed independently, the tax the patent system is imposing is a tax on one set of inventors (those who actually put
their inventions to good use) for the benefit of another set of inventors (those who did not). That is hard to justify.47

44. Love, supra note 28, at 1331.
45. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-465, Intellectual
Property: Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could
Help Improve Patent Quality 45(2013); Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 1849 (2016); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539 (2009) (arguing that patent disclosures of the modern
patent system are underperforming); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent
Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123 (2006) (arguing that disclosures in patents do not
serve the teaching function well); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1500–01 (2001); Sean B. Seymore, The
Teaching Function of Patents, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621 (2010) (arguing that
patents rarely communicate knowledge or technical information); cf. Brian T.
Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., R42668, An Overview of the “Patent Trolls” Debate
9 (2013) (describing why “it is economically infeasible or irrational for [parties]
to search through existing patents to avoid infringement”); Robin Feldman, Rethinking Patent Law 52–53 (2012) (describing limitations of disclosure in the
modern patent system).
46. There is no independent invention defense in patent law, and the vast
majority of patent lawsuits are filed not against those accused of copying the
invention from the patentee but against other inventors who came up with the
same idea independently. See, e.g., Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1424
(finding that allegations of copying are quite rare in patent cases).
47. If independent invention is widespread, it may suggest that the bar for
obviousness is set too low within the patent system. In other words, if others
can develop an idea without the benefit of the inventor’s wisdom, perhaps we
are not seeing wisdom but rather an advance that is obvious to those in the art.
Cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 SAINT
JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 94–96 (2008) (noting that the Federal Circuit has looked
disfavorably upon the idea that independent invention is relevant to an obviousness determination); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1534–35 (2007) (arguing that
evidence of independent invention should be a factor pointing toward obviousness). Courts in a prior era had given more credence to this evidence. See,
e.g., Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185 (1925) (stating that
independent inventions “within a comparatively short space of time . . . are in
themselves persuasive evidence that this use . . . was the product only of ordinary mechanical or engineering skill”).
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Under these circumstances, patent licensing does not benefit society by encouraging learning or dissemination of the patentee’s invention. The dissemination of that technology was already happening, no thanks to the patentee; the patent troll is
just collecting a tax from people who not only came up with the
idea on their own,48 but actually put the invention into practice.
One could argue that in its tax collector role, patent trolls
are at least returning dollars to original inventors, thereby encouraging innovation by facilitating the rewards that the patent
system promises to those who invent and disclose.49 In the absence of technology transfer, however, it is reasonable to question how much society wants to invest in moving money from one
independent inventor to another. Further, studies suggest that
such rewards are not flowing. In what economists are calling the
“leaky bucket,” only an estimated twenty percent of the payments to NPEs get back to the original inventor or into internal
research and development by the NPE.50 And there is some evidence that the prospect of later patent licenses is not what motivates many inventors, particularly in universities.51
As we discuss elsewhere, patentees can benefit society in
several possible ways: by making innovative products, by selling
or licensing the new knowledge to those who do, by sharing that
knowledge freely with those who learn from it, or even if others
illegally copy the invention from them.52 But patent enforcement
by NPEs against independent inventors (as opposed to those who
copied from the patent owner) doesn’t achieve any of those goals
48. Some independent invention occurs after the patentee invents, but before
the patent has issued. Other independent invention occurs even before the patentee invents, but it may not bar the later inventor from patenting if the first
inventor kept the idea secret. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 507–11 (6th ed.
2013).
49. Trolls may be intermediaries in this very different sense—not transmitting new technology to licensees and defendants, but facilitating suit by individuals or small companies who could not otherwise afford to sue. See, e.g., Stephen H. Haber & Seth H. Werfel, Patent Trolls as Financial Intermediaries?
Experimental Evidence, 149 ECON. LETTERS 64 (2016) (finding evidence in controlled experiments to support this hypothesis).
50. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 411; Fiona M. Scott Morton &
Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 482–83
(2014). For challenges to this evidence, see Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 4.
51. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a
Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering,
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 286 (2014).
52. Lemley & Feldman, Patent Licensing, supra note 6, at 191; Lemley &
Feldman, Efficient, supra note 6, at 649.
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directly. If patent trolls are also not returning much to original
inventors, it will be particularly important to see if their enforcement activity is leading to innovation by licensees. Otherwise,
all this patent assertion and licensing activity may simply be a
tax on current productivity with relatively little return to the innovation ecosystem.
B. EVIDENCE SO FAR; OUR PILOT STUDY
In prior work we provided the first survey evidence of the
direct measure of new product creation resulting from patent assertions by NPEs.53 We also tested commercialization effects by
measuring other markers of potential innovation, such as technology transfer beyond the patent.54 By including such markers,
we create a more dynamic picture of the potential for future commercialization, even if that commercialization has yet to occur.
While some have argued that NPEs serve as efficient middlemen—transferring inventions from creators to commercializers—we found no such evidence in our 2015 study.55 We surveyed 191 in-house licensing attorneys at companies that
produce products on the theory that these parties have direct
knowledge of whether the company implemented new technology and because in-house counsel tend to negotiate licenses both
as patent holders and as potential licensees.56 The survey examined the effects of licenses that a company took after receiving a
patent demand, which was defined to include calls or letters suggesting areas of mutual interest or joint ventures, offering to license patents, threatening litigation, giving notice of intent to
file an infringement lawsuit, or actually filing an infringement
lawsuit.57 We asked whether those licenses led to any markers
of innovation.58 Direct markers of innovation included the addition of new products or features.59 Indirect markers of innovation
included whether the patent holder transferred know-how, other
technical knowledge, or personnel (including through a consulting agreement) along with the patent, and whether any joint

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Lemley & Feldman, supra note 7.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 144–49 (describing methodology of 2015 study).
Id. at 149–55.
Id. at 155–66.
Id. at 160 fig.9, 161 figs.10 & 11.
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ventures were created.60 Again, our survey considered only licenses taken in response to unsolicited licensing requests.61
It did not look at the practice, particularly among university
inventors, of entering into technology transfer agreements before embarking on development of a new technology.62
The responses from our pilot study suggested that licensing
requests from NPEs rarely lead to direct or indirect markers of
innovation. Ninety-two percent of respondents reported that
when they licensed technology from NPEs, they added new products or features as a result of that licensing zero to ten percent
of the time.63 The results were even stronger when respondents
were asked about indirect markers of innovation, with respondents reporting with complete unanimity that they rarely received technical knowledge, transfer of personnel, or joint ventures along with a patent license.64 Thus, the results suggest
that NPEs do not appear to be playing the role of efficient middlemen. While it is certainly possible that a middleman role
could be reflected in some other markers than the ones we examined, we did not find such evidence in our preliminary work. Nor
have other studies. To the contrary, Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun,
and Scott Duke Kominers find that NPE patent assertions are
associated with less, not more, subsequent innovation by the targeted firm.65 And Brian Love, Kent Richardson, Erik Oliver, and
Michael Costa find that less than one percent of patent portfolios
offered for sale through brokers include any form of know-how
or technology beyond the patents themselves.66
Interestingly, the evidence was also dismal when ex post licensing requests came from those other than traditional NPEs.67
When product producing companies and universities made unsolicited approaches and those approaches resulted in a licensing agreement, the agreements were unlikely to lead to direct or
60. Id. at 162 figs.12 & 13, 163 figs.14 & 15, 164 figs.16 & 17, 165 figs.18 &
19, 166 fig.20.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id.
63. Id. Zero to ten percent was the lowest category offered. See id. at 157
fig.5. We suspect, though we cannot prove, that for almost all of respondents the
number was in fact zero.
64. Id. at 157.
65. Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 4
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2018).
66. Brian Love et al., An Empirical Look at the “Brokered” Market for Patents, 83 MO. L. REV. 359, 371 (2018).
67. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 160.

1808

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1793

indirect markers of innovation.68 Roughly three-quarters of respondents reported new products or features from zero to ten
percent of the time,69 ninety-four percent reported transfers of
personnel (including through consulting agreements) zero to ten
percent of the time,70 and ninety-one percent reported joint ventures from zero to ten percent of the time.71 These observational
results suggest that ex post patent licensing demands don’t appear to lead to technology transfer or other markers of innovation, no matter what type of party initiates the unsolicited approach.
But as we noted in that study, these results were preliminary and subject to a number of limitations:
But before we conclude that the patent system is not working, or that it is working only for practicing entities that want to
exclude their competitors from the market, we should gather
more data. Our survey is limited, both in the number of respondents and because of its low response rate. There may be other,
underrepresented sectors of the economy in which patent-based
technology transfer is significant. Or we may have found an unrepresentative subset of technology companies to survey. Our intent is to follow up with a more comprehensive survey in the near
future.72
This paper reflects that broader effort.
II. WHAT WE DID
We set out to survey a wide range of American businesses
about their experiences with patent assertion and enforcement
and its relationship to innovation. We put together a series of
questions about their experiences both with licensing demands
received from outside and about licensing demands they made of
other firms. We made clear that we were interested in patent
licensing demands that related to existing products (what we
called in the Iowa paper “ex post” licensing demands).73 We
wanted to know what sorts of entities sent those requests, and
what, if anything, happened as a result. In this Section we discuss how we decided who to contact and how we designed the
survey. We present the results in Part III.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 160–62.
Id. at 160 fig.9.
Id. at 164 fig.16.
Id. at 165 fig.18.
Id. at 177.
See id. at 139.
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A. DATA SOURCES AND PARTNERS
In developing the methodology and carrying out the study,
we worked closely with two organizations: the Indiana University Center for Survey Research (CSR) and Dun & Bradstreet
(D&B).74 We chose to partner with CSR to minimize methodological limitations encountered in the pilot study, as well as to preserve objectivity and confidentiality in data collection. CSR is an
academic research facility that has been conducting research
projects for over thirty years and is a founding member of the
Association of Academic Survey Research Organizations.75 The
senior methodologists at CSR have advanced training in quantitative and qualitative research methods and many years of experience in survey design, implementation, and analysis.76 Our
colleagues at CSR were primarily responsible for sending the
survey communications and managing the survey site, processes, and data.
Our second partner, Dun & Bradstreet, served as the source
of our survey sample. Specifically, we used Hoovers Inc., which
is a subsidiary of Dun & Bradstreet that offers proprietary business information.77 Dun & Bradstreet Hoovers (D&B Hoovers)
provides a database of over 120 million business records, representing the most comprehensive commercially available repository for data on U.S. companies.78 We are grateful to the National Science Foundation (NSF) for funding that allowed us
access to this proprietary database and permitted us to work
with professional survey experts.
B. SURVEY POPULATION
Working with our colleagues at CSR, the first step we undertook was to develop a sampling design to guide selection of
companies from the D&B Hoovers database. Our overall aim was
to approximate a stratified, random sample of the U.S. business
landscape. By consulting with individuals at Dun & Bradstreet,
74. Throughout the article, the Indiana University Center for Survey Research will primarily be referred to as “CSR.” Dun & Bradstreet will be identified by its full name in most places, except when discussing its database, which
we refer to in most places as the “D&B Hoovers database.”
75. See About: Center for Survey Research, IND. U. BLOOMINGTON, https://
csr.indiana.edu/about (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
76. See Team: About: Center for Survey Research, IND. U. BLOOMINGTON,
https://csr.indiana.edu/about/team/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
77. See What Is D&B Hoovers?, D&B HOOVERS, http://hoovers.com/what-is
-dnb-hoovers.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
78. See id.
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we determined the range of criteria that we could use in building
sample lists of companies. Such criteria included industry sectors, firm size (by number of employees or revenue), and titles or
type of employee.79 We included companies headquartered in the
United States with at least one employee and annual sales of $1
million or more. To avoid the problem of including companies
with multiple branches more than once, we chose to eliminate
branches from our sample. To avoid including both parent companies and their subsidiaries, we established that if an identified
subsidiary firm had a parent company within the same industry
group, then the subsidiary firm would be removed from the sample.80 As for the annual sales criterion of $1 million or greater,
we decided relatively early on to exclude extremely small companies, as they might not experience much patent licensing activity and/or be large enough to have in-house counsel available
to answer our survey. We were also concerned about the ability
of surveyors to find all startups, let alone good contact information for those startups, which could have made our results
unrepresentative. We considered several different exclusion criteria, such as the Small Business Association (SBA) definition of
a “small business,”81 but we ultimately settled on annual sales
of $1 million or greater. The large majority of firms with annual
receipts of $1 million or less are likely to be non-employer firms
(e.g., self-employed proprietorships) for which it would be extremely difficult to obtain any sort of survey response. By applying this sales minimum, we may be excluding small start-up
companies, but we believe that $1 million is low enough of a
threshold to capture a representative swath of the U.S. business
landscape.82
79. For a full list of data fields available through the D&B Hoovers database, see Access Hoover’s Data Descriptions, D&B HOOVERS, http://images
.hoovers.com/images/pdfs/Access_Hoovers_Data_Elements.pdf (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
80. This was a judgment call. There are circumstances in which the subsidiary might be the better choice. But we were not in a position to evaluate those
decisions case-by-case, and we wanted to make sure we didn’t double count related companies.
81. The definition is complicated and industry-specific. See 13 C.F.R.
§ 121.201 (2018).
82. This too was a judgment call. Arguably $1 million in revenue is too
small for many companies to worry very much about the patent system. But
startups do face patent threats, and we wanted to err on the side of over-inclusiveness. For information on patent demands and startup companies, see Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014);
Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014).
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We aimed our survey at operating companies. But given this
definition, it is possible some of the companies we surveyed are
“hidden non-practicing entities” that began by generating products or services but failed as businesses and switched to asserting patents against other companies as a business strategy. If
those hidden NPEs are answering our survey questions honestly, however, they will most likely be directed into an extremely abbreviated version of the survey via branching logic.
They will not have inbound licensing demands and so will not
reach most questions in the survey. The first screener question
in the survey asks whether the respondent has received patent
licensing demands in the past three years; if the company in
question is in fact a hidden NPE, and they are not generating
products or services, they are unlikely to receive patent demands
and will be screened out of the rest of the survey.83
The next step was to identify the specific industries to include. In the pilot study, we selected eleven industry sectors:
Computers & Other Electronics; Semiconductor; Pharmaceutical; Medical Devices, Methods & Other Medical; Biotechnology;
Communications; Transportation; Construction; Energy; Goods
& Services for Industrial & Business Uses; and Goods & Services
for Consumer Uses.84 To ensure an adequate number of companies per industry group in the current study, we chose to consolidate the industry categories from eleven to five. The five we
chose were: Computers & Related Fields (including other electronics, communications, and semiconductors); Life Sciences &
Related Fields (including pharmaceutical; biotechnology; and
medical devices, methods, or other medical); Transportation; Energy; and Chemistry. We then mapped the five industries selected onto the more granular industry codes by which companies are sorted in the D&B Hoovers database. Doing so allowed
us to more efficiently search for and precisely target companies
within the database.85
83. As with any survey, however, there is always a risk that a few respondents will answer dishonestly or try to distort the survey results.
84. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 145.
85. There were two different sets of industry codes that were available to
us: the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). SIC codes were four-digit numerical codes
assigned to businesses by the U.S. government to identify the primary business
of the establishment. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - NAICS, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html (last
updated Sept. 4, 2018); SIC Division Structure, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019) (providing a list of SIC codes for various industries). NAICS was
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To guarantee sufficient statistical power, we aimed to get
responses from 400 companies per industry. From the pilot
study, the pretest, and other research in patent assertion, we
knew the difficulties involved in obtaining survey responses
from companies.86 Thus, a generous response rate of ten percent
would require us to sample at least 4000 companies per industry.87 With five industries, the total would be 20,000 companies.
We decided to double that number to increase the buffer and ensure enough responses, resulting in a total sample size of 40,000.
Weighted by the number of companies in each industry in the
D&B Hoovers database population, 40,000 survey targets broke
down into 7272 companies from Computers & Related Fields,
8535 companies from Life Sciences & Related Fields, 18,735
companies from Transportation, 3262 companies from Energy,
and 2196 companies from Chemistry.
However, some percentage of the email addresses in the
D&B Hoovers database were likely to be outdated or inaccurate,
resulting in bounce-backs. Further, D&B Hoovers only has email
addresses for some of its company contacts.88 To account for possible bounce-backs, we asked Dun & Bradstreet to increase the
strata sizes, resulting in a total of 44,112 companies surveyed.
And to account for the companies without email addresses in the
D&B Hoovers database, we increased the sample size again, to
92,000 companies.89
adopted in 1997 to replace SIC and is similar in that it serves as a classification
of business establishments. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - NAICS, supra.
NAICS is the standard used today by federal statistical agencies for collecting,
analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.
Id. Given that NAICS was adopted more recently, and because U.S. census data
is more readily available through NAICS at this point, we chose to use NAICS
codes as opposed to SIC codes in identifying industries for our study. A full mapping of NAICS codes onto our industries of interest is available from the authors.
86. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 82, at 470; Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf,
Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 68
(2015); Feldman, supra note 82, at 259–60; Lemley et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 4–6).
87. These back-of-the-envelope calculations weren’t indicative of any survey design but rather rough estimates of what we expected to see.
88. The number of companies with at least one email address out of the
total 46,851 companies turned out to be 14,835 (or 31.66% of the total). Thus,
we could expect only about one third of our sample to have email addresses
listed in the D&B Hoovers database.
89. We made sure to request that Dun & Bradstreet not expunge the approximately two-thirds of the companies without emails so that we could attempt to contact those companies through non-email means. Specifically, we
asked Dun & Bradstreet to provide general firm contact information (e.g., front
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Next, we had to specify which, and how many, individuals
within each company should be selected for contact purposes. We
established a goal of at least one personnel contact per firm.
Many firms, however, have more than one personnel contact; in
those cases, we decided to have Dun & Bradstreet deliver all contacts available up to a maximum of three per firm.
Within a firm, we believed that those within the legal department of a company, especially patent or intellectual property
counsel, would be most qualified to respond to a survey regarding patent licensing requests, so we prioritized legal job functions in our sampling design. The D&B Hoovers database sorts
contacts by job title, such as “General Counsel” or “Chief Executive Officer.”90 There were fourteen relevant job titles within the
legal job function group in the database, including “Patent Law,”
“Vice-President Legal,” “General Counsel,” and “Legal Executive.”
One option was to have D&B Hoovers sort by companies
that have a legal email contact in their database, essentially including legal job function as another one of the broad search criteria along with our location, annual sales, etc. requirements.
This would have guaranteed a sample in which every company
had a contact in its legal department for us to survey, which
would have in turn increased our response rates and the likelihood that those answering the survey would be knowledgeable
about patent licensing. The problem with this approach was that
it would have created significant selection bias. There may be
notable differences between the type of company that would
desk phone number and postal addresses) if a company had no email addresses
available; this would allow us to supplement our email distribution of the survey
by calling and sending mail to a subset of those companies without any emails
listed in the D&B Hoovers database.
One limitation to quadrupling the strata sizes and then adding thirty percent on top was that it caused us to reach out to a larger percentage of companies in some industries than others to ensure that we had enough positive responses from each of the industries we tested. For example, the D&B Hoovers
database only had 17,801 companies available in the life sciences industry (defined by our NAICS codes), and we had initially requested 8535. Doubling that
initial request would result in 17,070 companies. Adding fifteen percent on top
of that would result in approximately 19,630 companies requested from an overall pool of 17,801 companies. As such, Dun & Bradstreet would have had to give
us all of the companies in the life sciences industry, which would eliminate the
possibility of pulling a random sample from the overall pool. We determined
that the benefits of having a larger pool of companies included in the sample
and thus increasing the number of companies with email contacts outweighed
the concerns about randomization.
90. See Access Hoover’s Data Descriptions, supra note 79.
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have a legal contact listed in the D&B Hoovers database and the
type of company that would not, and by selecting for those with
legal contacts up front, we could be skewing the data in unknown
ways. Instead, we had Dun & Bradstreet search for companies
meeting our specified criteria, whether they had a legal contact
listed or not, and then provide us with all of those companies
resulting from the randomized selection, separated into a file for
those with legal contacts and a file for those without legal contacts. If a firm had fewer than three legal contacts, we determined that the rest of the contacts should be made up by nonlegal contacts. We had initially considered specifying a short list
of non-legal job functions to include, such as “Chief Executive
Officer” or “Managing Director,” but we ultimately decided to include a broader range of non-legal job functions to increase our
yield of potential email contacts. To that end, we had Dun &
Bradstreet provide us with a full list of possible job functions,
and we simply whittled out the ones that were clearly not worthwhile, rather than hand-picking a few high-level, non-legal job
functions. The intention was not necessarily to have these nonlegal individuals take the survey, but rather to have them forward the email to the individual at their company who would be
the ideal respondent, whether that person was in the legal department or not.
C. DESIGNING THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
1. Pretest and Response Analysis
We conducted a small-scale “pretest” before carrying out the
full study to allow us to uncover and resolve methodological and
execution problems prior to the main data collection period. We
chose to limit the pretest to just three industries—Computers &
Related Fields, Life Sciences & Related Fields, and Transportation—and we set a target sample size of 3000 for the pretest. The
specific strata sizes for the three industries were 632 companies
for Computers & Related Fields, 741 for Life Sciences & Related
Fields, and 1627 for Transportation. As with the full study sample, we then chose to add fifteen percent on top of those figures
to account for email bounce-backs. We then doubled the sample
size for the pretest, as we did for the full study sample, to compensate for the fact that a significant percentage of the companies listed in the D&B Hoovers database do not have any email
contacts listed, resulting in a final sample size of approximately
6900 for the pretest.
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Having already carried out a pilot version of the study, we
had an existing questionnaire from which to build on at the start
of our study.91 We conducted several iterations of revisions to the
questionnaire, addressing issues such as wording, question type,
data type, branching logic, visual design and formatting, usability, and other methodological issues.
After carrying out a first round of edits to our survey questionnaire, we used cognitive testing to ensure the robustness and
accuracy of the questionnaire. Cognitive interviewing, using a
semi-structured interviewing protocol and special probing techniques, is an important method of identifying problems and limitations in the design of questionnaires.92 We approached fourteen individuals in the legal departments of companies including
Google, Dropbox, LinkedIn, Cisco, and Amneal Pharmaceuticals.
Though some of the cognitive interviewees may have been aware
of the article published about the pilot study, we had no reason
to believe that any of them had previously been exposed to the
text of the questionnaire itself. Our colleagues at CSR conducted
a total of six cognitive interviews. The cognitive interviews involved administering the revised questionnaire to the participants and asking follow-up questions to assess the participants’
thoughts on the questionnaire and possible ways to improve it.
The participants were sent the questionnaire in advance, and
the follow-up questions were administered over the phone.
Based on the feedback obtained through the cognitive interviews, we made further revisions to the survey.
First, through the cognitive interviews, we learned that we
needed to break up the questionnaire into clearly demarcated
sections, so that participants would be able to grasp the flow of
the questions earlier on in the survey. For the final version, we
separated the questions into different sections and began each
with a brief explanation describing the nature of that particular
section with the hope that this would help respondents understand the structure of the questionnaire more easily.
Another common question we received from cognitive interviewees was whether we wanted them to provide top-of-the-mind
responses or to look up company records in response to questions
in our survey asking for percentage estimates. For instance, for
91. The pilot survey questionnaire was published at Feldman & Lemley,
supra note 7, at 180–89.
92. For a comprehensive guide to cognitive interviewing techniques, see
generally GORDON B. WILLIS, COGNITIVE INTERVIEWING: A TOOL FOR IMPROVING QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN (2005).
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the question, “What percentage of licensing requests from nonpracticing entities led your company to take a patent license?”
with the options “None,” “1-10%,” “11-25%,” “26-50%,” “51-75%,”
“76-99%,” and “All,” the cognitive interviewees expressed uncertainty about whether they were simply supposed to provide a
best guess or were supposed to consult records to obtain a precise
figure. Without specifying, we could encounter a situation in
which some respondents were conducting external research
while others were simply providing best guesses, which would
create inconsistency in the data. We felt that it would be unreasonable to ask participants to invest the time and effort required
to conduct research and provide answers with 100% certainty, so
we revised the questionnaire to make explicit that we simply
wanted participants to supply their “best approximation.”93
There were a few other comments that we received from the
cognitive interview respondents that led us to change the content of the questionnaire. We shortened the length of time we
asked respondents to consider from five years to three. We clarified that the term “entities or individuals whose core activity
involves licensing or litigating patents” meant “NPE” as that
term is commonly used in the intellectual property sphere.94 And
we clarified some of the language of the questionnaires.
Finally, many of the cognitive interview respondents noted
to our colleagues at CSR that they would not have participated
had they not known that the Principal Investigators (PIs) were
involved. As such, we took steps to leverage name recognition to
induce participation in the survey, such as including a “Note
from the Researchers,” signed by both PIs, at the beginning of
the survey.
In the pilot study, we had several unusable responses in
which the participants began the survey but did not complete it
in its entirety. To encourage a higher rate of complete responses
and minimize the burden on participants, we streamlined the
language of the questions and branching logic of the survey. For
example, in the pilot study, we asked about how often patent licensing requests from other companies led to transfer of technical knowledge, transfer of personnel, and creation of a joint
93. At the beginning of the survey, we included a page stating: “Some questions in this survey ask for frequency counts or percentages. Please feel free to
answer simply using your best estimate or approximation.” Infra app. B. As a
follow-up, with the first question asking participants to estimate a percentage,
we included the language, “Please feel free to answer with your best approximation, here and throughout the survey.” Id.
94. Id.
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venture in three separate questions. For the current study, we
compressed those three questions into one question which asked
what portion of patent licensing requests “resulted in the operating company transferring technical knowledge, personnel (e.g.,
through a consulting agreement), or creating a joint venture
with your company . . . .”95 Furthermore, the language of the
questions and the response options were revised to maximize
clarity. In the pilot survey, one response option offered to participants when asked how often licenses from competitors resulted
in new products was “0-10%” of the time.96 We split this response
option up into categories of “None” and “1-10%” so that we would
be able to distinguish between respondents for which licenses
never led to new products and those for which licenses simply led
to new products infrequently. We also revised the options offered
in response to the question, “What parties initiated these [patent
licensing] requests?”97 In the pilot study, the parties included
were competitors, product-producing companies that are not
competitors, entities or individuals whose core activity involves
licensing or litigating patents, universities, and a “[n]ature of the
party was unclear” option.98 In the revised survey, we chose not
to make a distinction between competitors and non-competitors,
compressing the two into a category for “[c]ompanies whose core
activity is producing a product or service (i.e., operating companies).” We also added the option “[f]ederal labs, federal facilities,
federal research centers, and other federal government
sources”99 in response to a request from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Additionally, we supplemented the questionnaire with a few
new question banks. One concerned out-licensing requests,
which are circumstances in which the participant’s company
holds the patent and it is his/her company that approaches an
outside party to request they take a patent license.100
Another branch of questions that was added during our revision process concerned the practice of ex ante patent licensing.101 As opposed to ex post licensing agreements, which are
agreements formed after the technology in question has already
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 181.
Infra app. B.
Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 180.
Infra app. B.
Infra app. B.
Infra app. B.
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been invented and patented, ex ante licensing involves agreements that are formed at the beginning of the innovation process, granting patent rights to a technology that has yet to be
invented or is in the process of being invented.102 Though our
study is primarily focused on ex post licensing requests, collecting information on ex ante agreements allowed us to more fully
assess the state of the patent licensing landscape, and how levels
of innovation compare between ex ante and ex post situations.
This addition was made in response to suggestions gathered during the NSF peer review process. Within this ex ante licensing
question bank, we included two branches: one concerning collaboration with universities and one concerning collaboration with
federal labs or centers, such as Department of Energy national
labs, NASA research centers, and NIH centers or institutes.103
The inclusion of questions about federal labs and centers was
again prompted by a request from the GAO.
Once the questionnaire was finalized, staff at CSR programmed it as a web survey through Qualtrics. Prior to launching the pretest, we conducted several test runs of the online survey instrument to catch any flaws that might not have been
apparent before. We noticed that, in some cases, the email containing the link to the survey was directed to the spam or junk
folder rather than the inbox. Our colleagues at CSR ran the
email through a website that scores emails based on their likelihood of being flagged as spam—the email was rated as having a
low likelihood of alerting spam filters. Filters for spam and junk
mail are largely a black box controlled by proprietary email clients and platforms, so it is impossible to know for sure what
might have led our email to be directed into spam folders on occasion, but nevertheless, we took steps to reduce the likelihood
of this occurring during the actual administration of the survey.
For instance, the PIs received several responses to the email
campaigns asking for confirmation that the survey that they received from CSR was legitimate and not a scam. In response, we
decided to change the from line of the emails from “Indiana University Center for Survey Research” to “Professor Mark Lemley,
Stanford Law School,” because we felt that an email sent directly
from one of the researchers, especially given his high name
recognition in the field, would be less likely to raise unwarranted
102. See Ralph Siebert, What Determines Firms’ Choices Between Ex Ante
and Ex Post Licensing Agreements?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 165, 167–
69 (2015).
103. Infra app. B.
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suspicion. We also put contact information for both of the PIs in
the signature line of the emails. We also modified the language
and tone of the emails to err more on the formal as opposed to
casual side, with the hope that such language would help create
the impression of legitimacy.104 Battling the spam misperception
is a concern in any survey research administered by email, and
there is only so much one can do to combat it. Given that we
received only a handful of responses expressing concern that the
email might be spam, out of over 34,000 advance notification
emails and over 30,000 survey invitation emails sent out, we believe that spam misperception is an important concern, but not
one that would greatly impact our study. This field test also led
us to make further minor modifications to the final questionnaire.
A final version of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.
2. Pretest Response Rate and Study Modifications
The overall response rate for the pretest, as well as the percentage of respondents with patent licensing activity, was lower
than expected. Of the approximately 2700 companies contacted
by email or phone, we received sixty-four complete survey responses. Of the sixty-four complete responses, only eight companies reported having received patent licensing requests within
the past three years. Separate from the phone treatment, CSR
also conducted follow-up calls for fifty companies who had been
emailed to assess why people might be disinclined to participate.
Apart from the general issue of not having enough time, those
called cited low topic salience, especially those who came from
companies with no patent activity. Respondents had a hard time
understanding why they should take a survey about something
entirely unrelated to them; this comment from those who were
called was reinforced by responses we received to the email campaigns. This finding bolsters our hypothesis that the low response rate in the pretest was largely due to imprecise targeting
of the most relevant population, resulting in low topic salience
among many of those who were contacted.
Part of the problem was that we cast an extremely wide net
to obtain a representative sample of the overall U.S. business
landscape, so it was inevitable that for a large percentage of our
104. For instance, various exclamation points were replaced with periods
and phrases like “This might be of interest on your Friday afternoon” were removed.
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individuals, patent licensing would be an irrelevant topic. Additionally, however, the failure to reach those for which the survey
would have the highest topic salience was in large part due to
problems with the sample supplied by Dun & Bradstreet, as it
became clear that their database was lacking in contacts from
legal departments. Rather, the large majority of the contacts we
received from Dun & Bradstreet were miscellaneous individuals
within random departments, who unsurprisingly, had no experience with patent licensing. Of the approximately 2500 contacts
supplied for the pretest, only sixty-six were classified by Dun &
Bradstreet as legal contacts.105
The dearth of legal contacts was a problem in the main survey sample as well—of the approximately 87,000 companies provided for the main test, only 778 of them came with an email
address of a legal individual from the company. Moreover, a significant number of the companies included were holding or liquidating companies. Given that such companies do not tend to
be actual product or service generating businesses, they fall outside the scope of the type of companies we had intended to target.
The pretest revealed other problems with the database as
well. In the pretest, the number of email addresses that resulted
in bounce-backs was higher than the estimate we were originally
given by Dun & Bradstreet. In the pretest, approximately seventeen percent of the companies emailed (426 of the 2477 companies with email addresses) had a final disposition of bounced,
meaning that all email addresses on file for that company had
been tried and had bounced back.
Most of the methodological changes we made after the pretest were aimed at re-directing our contact efforts toward individuals within a company for which patent licensing would be a
more salient topic, like those in legal departments. Inevitably,
however, we would still be reaching many individuals from companies with very little to no patent licensing activity and for
which patent licensing is thus a low salience topic. It is important that we receive completed survey responses from those
individuals as well, as such counterfactual cases are crucial to
confirming or denying our original hypothesis. Although the
study materials (emails, website, etc.) we used during the pretest touched on this issue minimally, we decided to further emphasize the necessity of participation even for those without patent licensing activities in the full survey rather than risk
105. Of those sixty-six legal individuals contacted, only two completed the
survey.
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biasing the results towards those companies that had actually
been the target of patent licensing demands.
Of the problems encountered in the pretest, the greater than
anticipated number of bounce-backs had the most straightforward solution. We had initially requested that Dun & Bradstreet
increase the size of our samples by fifteen percent to account for
email bounce-backs. Given that the percentage of bounce-backs
was even higher than we had initially been led to believe, falling
at approximately seventeen percent for the pretest, we requested
that Dun & Bradstreet increase the percentage of additional
companies for the main sample from fifteen to twenty percent.106
Given that one of the key problems from the pretest was not
targeting the firms and individuals for which the survey would
be most relevant with enough precision, we decided to identify a
group of companies that we could presume would have a higher
likelihood of patent licensing activity, and thus would be more
likely to answer the survey. We decided that the primary variable available in the D&B Hoovers database that would be correlated with a higher likelihood of patent licensing activity was
firm size, with revenue as a proxy for size. Companies with
higher revenues are more likely to be engaging in activities that
would prompt other entities to request that they take patent licenses. Moreover, those companies are more likely to be large
enough to have a dedicated legal department to deal with patent
licensing requests and litigation. We set various revenue benchmarks to separate out this “higher likelihood” subset—additional measures would be targeted to the group with revenues of
$25 million or greater, and certain resource-intensive efforts
would be reserved for the group with revenues of $100 million or
greater.
We also decided to establish an industry-based definition of
companies with a higher likelihood of patent licensing activity.
Specifically, we believed the Computers and Life Science indus-

106. After asking Dun & Bradstreet to increase the bump in the sample size
for bounce-backs from fifteen to twenty percent, the number of companies requested in the Life Sciences and Transportation industries was large enough
that Dun & Bradstreet provided us with all companies in those industries in its
database. The same was almost true of Energy, with Dun & Bradstreet supplying 7829 companies out of 7846 available. We discuss the implications of receiving all companies in a particular industry supra note 89. As we decided earlier,
when this issue came up with Life Sciences after we decided to add fifteen percent and double the strata sizes, the benefits of having a larger sample size
outweighed the possible randomization limitations in our view.
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tries were the two most likely industries to see strong effects related to patent licensing and innovation (or lack thereof). Thus,
given our limited resources, we decided to target certain supplementary efforts aimed at increasing response rate at just those
two industries.
Our final defining characteristic for companies we would
consider to have a “higher likelihood” of having patent licensing
activity and answering the survey was companies with a legal
contact provided by Dun & Bradstreet. We expected that individuals in legal departments would be most likely to take the
survey, given their greater familiarity with the field of patent
licensing. Additionally, we believed that those companies that
were large enough to have a legal department for which Dun &
Bradstreet was able to obtain contact information would be large
enough to have experience with patent licensing requests.
One problem from the pretest was identifying those companies for which patent licensing would be most relevant. Another
related problem was identifying the individual within those
companies for whom patent licensing would be most relevant.
Ideally, the person answering the survey would be an intellectual property or patent lawyer at a company—the type of person
who would have firsthand experience with patent licensing activities. If such an individual was not available, however, then
any individual within the legal department (provided that they
were high-ranking enough, and not just an intern or paralegal)
would be preferred. If no legal individual was available, then our
next priority would be senior management, such as CEOs and
high-level managers. Much of our ability to reach the appropriate individual, however, was subject to the quality of the data
provided by Dun & Bradstreet—if their database was not expansive enough to include a legal contact from a particular company,
then we were stuck with contacting whatever non-legal individual they did have listed and asking for the legal department.
Rather than rely solely on the Dun & Bradstreet contacts
database, we used a variety of methods to find contact information for persons at the companies in our sample who were in
legal departments or otherwise more qualified to take the survey. These methods included having research assistants search
for contact information online using LinkedIn, using the online
search tool called Hunter to locate email addresses, and having
staff at CSR place phone calls to companies. Phone calls and
mailed letters are resource-intensive, however, at least compared to email communication. Thus, we could not target every
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company included in our study with these supplemental modes
of contact. We decided to focus these additional efforts on the
“higher likelihood” subset, as we did the research assistant
searches and other efforts at obtaining more useful contact information. To be clear, we still surveyed the entire sample we
received from Dun & Bradstreet using the email method from
the pretest. With this new approach, we simply targeted a relevant subset with additional phone and mail communications.
That may have increased their response rate compared to other
companies, an approach that CSR used design and post-stratification weights to attempt to correct for.
D. THE FINAL SURVEY
The full survey was launched on May 22, 2017, with the advance notification email going out to over 34,000 companies. The
survey invitation email was sent out four days later, on May 25,
2017, to over 30,000 companies (the number is reduced because
a certain percentage of the companies who received the advance
notification emails bounced back or opted out).
As of June 7, 2017, we had received 414 responses to the
survey, with the highest percentage of responses after sending
out the survey invitation email and the second reminder email.
At that point, we noted that some of the respondents were starting to show signs of email fatigue. Thus, we held off on sending
the next reminder email to provide a break between campaigns.
In the meantime, secondary and tertiary contacts, who were
added as replacements to bounced primary contacts, were
emailed, as they had yet to receive any additional reminders. Of
the 414 responses we had received, seventy had answered “yes”
to the preliminary screening question of, “In the last three years,
has your company received patent licensing requests?”107
As of July 6, 2017, we had emailed 35,116 companies. At
that point, we sent postal nudges to companies in two “higher
likelihood” subsets: (1) all companies for which we had a legal
contact, regardless of industry and revenue, and (2) Computers
and Life Sciences companies with no legal contact, with revenues
greater than $25 million, and who had been emailed with no response. Of those companies who had been sent the postal nudge,
107. As for the other primary questions about patent licensing activities,
thirty-eight had answered yes to the question about out-licensing, fifty had answered yes to the question about ex ante collaboration with universities, and
twenty had answered yes to the question about ex ante collaboration with federal labs or centers.
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357 had not been emailed simply because there was no email address on file. We contacted those companies via telephone to obtain an email address so that they could subsequently be sent
the email campaigns.
A subsample of those companies that received the postal
nudge also then received a phone nudge. The subsample for the
phone nudge consisted of two “higher likelihood” subsets: (1) all
companies for which we had a legal contact, regardless of industry and revenue, and (2) Computers and Life Sciences companies
with no legal contact and with revenues greater than $100 million.
Throughout this process, CSR continued to call companies
without an email contact to obtain updated contact information
and to ask the screener questions. Companies for which the interviewers were able to obtain an email address were then sent
the email campaigns unless they answered “no” to all of the
screener questions.
As of July 6, 2017, we had received 539 completed responses,
103 of which had answered “yes” to the question, “In the last
three years, has your company received any patent licensing requests?” We had also received 151 responses through the phone
screenings, all of which answered “no” to the screener questions.
On July 10, 2017, to improve response rates further, we decided to expand the parameters of the phone nudge to match
those of the postal nudge. Previously, we had planned on calling
only non-respondent companies with a legal contact and non-respondent companies without a legal contact in Computers and
Life Sciences with revenues greater than $100 million. We decided to lower the revenue criterion for the phone nudges from
$100 million to $25 million ($25 million being the revenue criterion used for the postal nudges) to increase the scope of our
phone contact efforts.
The total survey requests sent out by industry are detailed
in Table 1.
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Table 1
Total Contacts Available for Surveying
Industry

Requested
Strata

Increased
by 20%

Doubled

Counts
Based on
Availability
in Database

Computers

7,272

8,726

17,453

17,453

Life Sciences

8,535

10,242

20,484

13,374

Transportation

18,735

22,482

44,964

42,942

Energy

3,262

3,914

7,829

7,829

Chemistry

2,196

2,635

5,270

5,270
TOTAL: 86,868

Table 2
Count of Units Sampled by Industry and Mode
Industry

Total
Sampled for
Email

Total
Sampled for
Phone

Total Worked

Chemistry

2,580

1,734

4,314

Computer

9,161

1,287

10,448

Energy

3,140

2,802

5,942

Life Science

4,536

2,344

6,880

Transportation

14,910

1,618

16,528

All Industries

34,237

9,785

44,112

During the field period, CSR attempted contact with 44,112
businesses at a contact rate of 17.3%.108
The questionnaire was composed of a set of four preliminary,
screener questions meant to gage the level of patent activity at
the business followed by up to twenty-eight possible questions in
the core questionnaire. Lastly, the questionnaire posed four establishment-level and one respondent-level demographic questions. In addition, an optional prompt for contact information
was provided in case the respondent would like to be sent the
findings of the study. The overall response rate to the survey as
a whole, including the preliminary questions and core questionnaire, was 4.5%. Response rate to the core questionnaire by companies deemed to be eligible by the screener questions was 100%.
While we would have preferred a higher response rate, this is in

108. We sampled 34,327 by email and 9785 by follow-up phone survey.
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line with other work using similar designs.109 Further, given the
weighting scheme described below,110 it is unlikely the nonresponse rate significantly biased the sample in a way that made
it unrepresentative of the population of interest.111
The full breakdown of responses to email and phone surveys
is reported in Table 3:
Table 3
Survey Disposition Summary Results
Codes
Disposition Label
Eligible, Interview
1.11
Complete screener
(eligible)

1.12

Complete screener
(ineligible)

Eligible, Non-Interview
2.11
Refusal

2.112

Implicit Refusal

2.2

Non-contact

Disposition Definition

Cases

Respondent answered at
least one preliminary question and screened into core
questionnaire
Respondent answered all
preliminary questions and
screened out of core questionnaire

421

Informant or target respondent refused to participate in the survey on behalf of the company
Email recipient logged on
to the Qualtrics instrument but did not answer
any questions
Direct contact could not be
made with the establishment but the existence of
the listed company was
confirmed

1,430

1,297

25

1,218

109. See, e.g., Graham et al., supra note 11, at 1272 (obtaining a 7.0% uncorrected and 8.4% corrected response rate for their Dun & Bradstreet sample);
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
421, 421 (2017) (reporting a ten percent response rate for industry respondents).
110. See infra Part II.D.
111. Robert M. Groves, Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 646, 647–50 (2006).
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Other eligible, noninterview

Unknown Eligibility
3.11
No invitation sent

3.19

Nothing
turned

ever

3.3

Invitation returned
undeliverable

Ineligible
4.1
Out of sample

re-
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Contact could be made
with the establishment but
not with the target respondent. Existence of
listed establishment has
been confirmed.

3,370

Company was sampled but
not worked in any survey
component
No indication of whether
email recipient received
the survey invitation or
any subsequent reminders
All emails were returned
undeliverable by all email
addresses

4,907

Company was identified as
out of sample during the
survey field period (i.e. informant confirmed that the
company no longer exists
in its sampled form)

290

26,089

5,065

Total: 44,112

E. WEIGHTING
The weighting process undertaken by CSR is simple in its
aim and intuition but mathematically complex in practice. As
such, we present the intuition and some simple justification. At
its core, the goal of survey weighting is to make a sample of a
population more representative of the population itself. It does
this by inflating the influence of some observations in the sample
on the results by increasing their weights and deflating the influence of others by decreasing their weights. CSR performed
this inflation and deflation based on the responding company’s
industry, census region, and revenue.
After correcting for the possible bias introduced by email address and telephone restrictions, our survey experts tuned the
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weights112 to make the sample representative of the U.S. business distribution of revenue and industry. We matched the U.S.
112. The mechanisms by which email addresses are located by Dun & Bradstreet are likely not random. In such situations, the American Association of
Public Opinion Research recommends estimating the probability of being included in an email panel using available information. REG BAKER ET AL., AAPOR, REPORT OF THE AAPOR TASK FORCE ON NON-PROBABILITY SAMPLING 41
(2013), https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/NPS_TF_
Report_Final_7_revised_FNL_6_22_13.pdf. We used a method described by
Sunghee Lee and Richard Valliant in which probabilities are estimated for both
the email group and a reference group—in this case the portion not selected for
the email/web component. Sunghee Lee & Richard Valliant, Estimation for Volunteer Panel Web Surveys Using Propensity Score Adjustment and Calibration
Adjustment, 37 SOC. METHODS & RES. 319 (2009). To perform this estimation,
CSR fit the following logistic regression model on auxiliary variables provided
by Dun & Bradstreet for the entire sample:
𝑦 ̂ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼 + 𝛽2𝑅 + ln𝑅𝑣 (𝛽3𝐼 + 𝛽4𝑅) + 𝜀
where 𝑦 ̂, a binary indicator of whether the company had an email address available, is regressed onto:
𝐼 = the industry group of the company (mapped by NAICS code as described in appendix A);
𝑅 = the U.S. census region (mapped by state of establishment address); and
ln𝑅𝑣 = the natural log of the company’s annual revenue in $U.S. millions.
These covariates, which predicted the presence of an email within the provided dataset with 70.2% accuracy, were chosen based not only on their perceived strength in explaining the independent variable but also their possible
correlation with survey analysis variables. While other variables were available
in the dataset, many either had missing data or added little additional explanatory power. However, without knowing the full scope of Dun & Bradstreet’s
methods for obtaining email addresses, the model could be subject to misspecification.
Using these estimated probabilities, we followed guidance provided by Lee
and Valliant of using propensity score classification to group like probabilities
together such that each grouping matches establishments with and without an
email address based on estimated likelihood of having an email address as determined by the covariates. Following the suggestion of Lee & Valliant and
Cochran, we developed five classes. See id. at 321; see also W.G. Cochran, The
Effectiveness of Adjustment by Subclassification in Removing Bias in Observational Studies, 24 BIOMETRICS 295, 296–97 (1968). Each class is then provided
a single adjustment factor that is equal to:
𝑓 𝑐 = ∑ 𝑑𝑒 𝑡 𝑒∈(𝑠𝑐 𝑡) /∑ 𝑑𝑒 𝑡 𝑒∈(𝑠𝑡) ∑ 𝑑𝑒 𝑚 𝑒∈(𝑠𝑐𝑚) /∑ 𝑑𝑒 𝑚 𝑒∈(𝑠𝑚)
where the proportion of class membership to entire subsample for the nonemail, reference group is represented in the numerator and the proportion of
class membership to entire subsample for the email group is represented in the
denominator. This adjustment is then multiplied by the base weight to form an
adjusted base weight. A similar adjustment was also made to the telephone
screener subsample based on the estimated probability of not having an email.
In addition to the unknown probability of having an email, a significant
portion of the worked sample were deemed to have an unknown eligibility to
participate in the overall survey at the end of the field period. We could not

2019]

SOUND AND FURY

1829

business population percentages exactly to the 2012 U.S. economic census.113
CSR’s weighting also addresses concerns that could have resulted from low response rates. A low response rate is problematic when the small sample of responders isn’t representative of
the population. If the sample is representative of the population,
however, the response sizes do not raise the same concerns. Our
weighting makes our sample more representative of the population and thus reduces potential sample size concerns.
As an example, consider the transportation portion of our
sample. In the weighted analysis, transportation companies
make up forty-two percent of our sample. The large proportion
of transportation companies is partly due to restrictions we put
on the data. According to the U.S. census, when you restrict the
pool of all companies to those within one of the five industry sectors we studied having a U.S. zip code, not a subsidiary, greater
than $1 million in revenue, and having at least one employee,
forty-seven percent of the resulting companies are transportation companies. Put differently, when you only consider energy,
computer, life science, chemistry, and transportation companies,
transportation companies make up a large proportion of the
confirm those companies were still operating during the field period. The sample weights for these cases were distributed equally among all other response
types, including respondents, non-respondents, and ineligibles such that the
weight of the “knowns” scale up to the aggregate weight of the contacted portion
(i.e. known and unknown).
We then balanced the resultant weights for all respondent cases to approximate U.S. population proportions using a method referred to as raking. We
used the survey package of the statistical programming language R. In balancing the sample weights, we focused on two auxiliary variables: count of firms by
case-level industry group (mapped by NAICS code, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart=2012 (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019)) and count of firms by revenue class. Upon examining cell counts
of respondent companies for each variable, we collapsed certain revenue classes
to increase the number of units in each cell and facilitate more stable estimates.
Finally, after balancing the weights, we examined the distribution to identify outliers with the potential to significantly increase the variance. According
to a commonly used criterion, we trimmed weights to the value of the median
weight plus six times the interquartile range and distributed the excess among
all other weights to maintain the total population counts. Since redistribution
has potential to increase weights, we repeated the process of trimming and redistribution until all weights were within the bounding limit. SADEQ CHOWDHURY ET AL., WEIGHT TRIMMING IN THE NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION SURVEY
2652–55 (2007), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260348642_Weight_
Trimming_in_the_National_Immunization_Survey.
113. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 SUSB ANNUAL DATASETS BY
ESTABLISHMENT INDUSTRY (2012), https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2012/
econ/susb/2012-susb.html.

1830

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1793

available respondents. Thus, weighting makes the sample more
representative of the population.
Last, while the weighting changed the sample demographics
from those recorded to ones matching the population demographics, it does not change the categorical conclusions we
make. To confirm this conclusion, we show the unweighted numbers in Appendix A.114 The Appendix demonstrates that the results with unweighted data differed only in minor magnitude
and not in direction or trend.
III. RESULTS
A. OVERALL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our survey generated responses from 1718 companies. Of
those, 1297, or 75.5%, were identified in the screener questionnaire as having never received patent licensing demands. Companies with no experience with patent licensing demands answered only a few questions, since most questions did not apply
to them.115
We report the breakdown by revenue and industry in Table
4, as well as the weighting we applied to match responses to the
census data.
Table 4
Results by Industry
Industry

Chemistry
Computer
Energy
Life Science
Transportation
Total

Count
of
Cases
222
433
185
410
468

% of
total

% of
total

12.9
25.2
10.8
23.9
27.2

Sum of
Balanced
Weights
6,233
20,635
9,257
24,220
53,167

1,718

% of
total

5.5
18.2
8.2
21.3
46.8

Count of
Firms in
U.S. Pop.
6,233
20,635
9,257
24,220
53,167

100

113,512

100

113,512

100

5.5
18.2
8.2
21.3
46.8

Companies in the transportation industry were less likely to
respond to our survey at all than companies in the chemistry and
114. Because of the relatively complicated survey design involved in this project, we choose to exclude hypothesis tests based on unweighted data. To avoid
biased estimates and inferences, we only present inference based on weighed
data.
115. If companies answered only some but not all questions, we included
them only in considering the questions they answered.
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computer industries. That may well be because patents simply
aren’t that important to many transportation businesses, particularly small trucking or shipping firms, and firms with no connection to the patent system were naturally less likely to respond to our survey, despite our entreaties.
We did worry that while transportation companies make up
forty-seven percent of our population, the patent system is disproportionately irrelevant to them when compared with other
industries. If this were the case, we would be biasing the observations on patent assertion toward companies that typically do
not have patents asserted against them. It is unlikely that this
is the case. We studied the “nonapplicability rate” by industry—
the percentage of respondents who had never faced a patent assertion. We report the results in Table 5. The average nonapplicability rate is around eighty percent. While it is slightly
higher than average in transportation, transportation companies were more likely to report patent assertions than the energy
industry, and in any event the results are not dramatically different by industry. The patent system may not affect a large portion of transportation companies, but it does not ignore them disproportionately.116

116. We cannot exclude the possibility that companies in certain industries
were less likely to respond because the patent system was simply not relevant
to them. Weighting should account for this in our substantive results.
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Table 5
Non-applicability of Patent Assertion by Industry

In most of what follows, we report only data from the subset
of companies within each industry that faced at least one patent
licensing demand during the three-year study period.
B. RESULTS BY TYPE OF LICENSING ENTITY
The results of our broader study largely validates the results
of our initial pilot survey. We find that patent licensing demands
rarely lead to further innovation. We asked directly whether the
presence of a patent license demand led to the creation of a new
product, as that could be an indication that the patent license
led to new innovation.117
117. Or maybe not. Some of the respondents who said yes may well have
redesigned their products to avoid infringement without necessarily making
those products better, and indeed possibly making them worse. Such a litigation-induced design-around is innovation of a sort and will sometimes lead a
company to valuable new avenues. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1050 n.17 (2001) (collecting
sources). But sometimes it is just a wasteful expenditure to avoid having to pay
a royalty on an existing product. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 190–93 (2003) (“[E]mpirical evidence indicates
that inventing around is widespread and costly.”); Colleen V. Chien & Mark A.
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When operating companies asserted patents, two-thirds of
respondents indicated that they never or almost never changed
their products or developed new products as a result of the patent license request, even when they took a license to the patent.
Only eleven percent of respondents indicated that they always
did so.
Table 6
Percent of Firms whose Purchased Operating Company Patents Led to
New Products

Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 34–35 (2012) (calling designing around a patent to avoid litigation “wasted
effort” because most patent suits fail); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1869–70 (1984) (“Because inventing around does not contribute to welfare when combinations are permitted, the resources devoted to the task are entirely wasted.”); Richard C. Levin
et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: SPECIAL ISSUE ON MICROECONOMICS,
1987, at 783, 807–12; Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An
Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907, 913 (1981) (finding that sixty percent of studied patented innovations were imitated within four years, generally at increased cost); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969) (arguing that while duplicative research may
“produce new net gains,” it is often “wasteful” because that same effort could
have gone to addressing unsolved problems).

1834

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1793

Compared to operating company assertions, patent licenses
demanded by NPEs were even less likely to lead to new products
or product changes. More than five in every six firms said they
never or almost never changed their product or developed new
products as a result of taking a license from an NPE; less than
three percent indicated that they always did so.
Table 7
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased NPE Patents Led to New Products

Not all NPEs are created equal, however. Universities and
federal labs are NPEs in the strict sense—they don’t make products.118 In our study we defined NPEs more narrowly, to focus on
those in the business of asserting patents.119 Licensing requests
118. Lemley, supra note 10, at 629–31 (contrasting universities with other
NPEs because their licenses are generally not just forbearance from suit but
instead include technology transfer and expertise).
119. We defined NPEs as those “whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents.” That is a broader definition than what some would consider a
pure PAE, because it includes companies and individuals who assert their own
patents rather than acquiring those patents from outside. The follow-up questions then asked about NPEs separately from universities and federal labs. It
is possible that some people still lumped universities in when they were answering about NPEs, but our questions should have guided them away from that.
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by two types of NPEs—universities and federal labs—were much
more likely to lead to new products. Still, more than half of respondents said university licensing requests almost never led to
the creation of new products. The federal lab numbers are somewhat better, but the small number of companies who got licensing requests from federal labs makes it hard to generalize. It is
notable, however, that demands from both universities and federal labs were more likely to generate new products than operating companies, and certainly than other types of NPEs.120

120. We performed all statistical testing using two-sample z-tests for difference in proportions and statistical significance was assessed at the .05 level. We
used the survey weights and not the raw data. We performed a statistical test
to determine whether federal labs patent assertions were more likely to lead to
innovation than other forms of patent assertion and found a statistically significant difference in most results. See Table 8.
Table 8
Statistical Tests Comparing Federal Labs to Other Entities
OC 0-10% pat: NPE 0-10% pat: Uni 0-10% pat:
36%
70%
33%
NPE 0-10% pat: 70% -34%
Uni 0-10% pat: 33%
3%
37%
Fed 0-10% pat: 19%
17%
51%
14%
In the margins of the tables are the estimated percentages for the individual variables. For example, in the first table the cell labeled “OC 0-10% pat” has
“36%” below it. That means that the percentage of companies that responded 010% on converting purchased patents into products when the patent was asserted by operating companies was 36%. The cells inside the table are the differences in the observed proportions subtracting the left margin from the top
margin. Numbers are in bold when the difference is statistically significant at
the p<0.05 level. Because we calculated a series of hypothesis tests, it was important to take into account the issue of multiple comparisons. Statistics
teaches us that by running enough tests, something will eventually come up
significant purely by chance. In fact, running tests until significance is encountered and generating many new hypotheses after inspecting the data are what
constitute “p-hacking.” See Stephan B. Bruns & John P.A. Ioannidis, p-Curve
and p-Hacking in Observational Research, PLOS ONE, Feb. 17, 2016, at 2, http://
europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC4757561&blobtype=pdf.
To avoid both of these issues, we specified the hypotheses we were interested in
testing prior to testing and used the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to correct
for multiple comparisons. See generally Yoav Benjamini & Yosef Hochberg, Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple
Testing, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 289 (1995).
A small number of respondents indicated patent licensing demands from
“others” besides operating companies, NPEs, universities, or federal labs. That
might include patent pools or individuals. Forty percent of those companies indicated that they almost never changed their products as a result, but the numbers are too small to draw many conclusions.
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Table 9
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased University Patents Led to New
Products

Table 10
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased Federal Patents Led to New Products
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We also asked about various indicia that might indicate a
patent license involved the transfer of knowledge. Specifically,
we asked whether the patent license came with any trade secrets
or other know-how, came with new employees, or was part of a
joint venture. The economic literature emphasizes the importance of tacit knowledge in innovation.121 True innovation
and learning is rarely accomplished by a written document
alone; it often requires cooperation and the communication of information learned on the job about how to make things work and
solve particular problems.122 Thus, this complex of questions
gets at indirect measures of knowledge transfer and might indicate a socially valuable transaction even if the recipient denied
designing a new product as a result. It might also provide a way
to distinguish between socially valuable new products and those
created merely to avoid infringing a patent right.
The results for evidence of knowledge transfer associated
with patents is dismal. Even fewer companies report any indicia
of knowledge transfer than reported developing new products.
When operating companies demanded patent licenses, more
than seventy percent of firms told us that those demands were
almost never accompanied by any sort of knowledge transfer,
and only ten percent indicated that they always were.

121. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 36, at 997–98 (using the example of designing an automobile).
122. This is likely to be truer in some industries than others and for some
inventions than others. Some ideas are simple and can be learned from reading
a patent. But in more complex industries reading a patent is not a common way
to advance knowledge. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (2008) (describing how engineers and university researchers in the IT industries intentionally avoid reading patents). But see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 548 (2012) (finding that sixty-four percent of surveyed nanotechnology researchers had read patents, and seventy percent of those did so for technical information); Ouellette, supra note 109, at 421–23 (surveying who reads
patents and their purposes for doing so across six industries).
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Table 11
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased Operating Company Patents Led to
Knowledge Transfer

The results are even worse for NPEs. Nearly ninety percent
of respondents told us they almost never got knowledge transfer
from NPE patent license demands; only one respondent said
they always did.
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Table 12
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased NPE Patents Led to Knowledge
Transfer

Universities did better than NPEs when it came to
knowledge transfer, but not by much; more than seventy percent
of respondents said they almost never got knowledge from university patent licenses, while just over ten percent said they always did. Federal labs did the best, as with the new product
questions.123 Patent assertions by federal labs were statistically

123. Patent assertions by federal labs were statistically more likely to lead
to knowledge transfer than other forms of patent assertion.
Table 13
Knowledge Transfer by Federal Labs Compared to Other Entities
OC 0-10% pat:
NPE 0-10% pat:
Uni 0-10%
44%
84%
pat: 28%
NPE 0-10% pat: 84% -40%
Uni 0-10% pat: 28%
16%
56%
Fed 0-10% pat: 20%
24%
64%
8%
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more likely to lead to knowledge transfer than other forms of patent assertion.
Table 14
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased University Patents Led to Knowledge
Transfer

Table 15
Percent of Firms Whose Purchased Federal Patents Led to Knowledge
Transfer
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C. BIAS IN THE PERCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER
While our focus was on companies that received patent licensing demands, we also asked companies whether they made
patent license demands of others and, if so, what happened with
those demands. A significant share of our respondents did in fact
report patent outlicensing efforts. Of those, just over half indicated that their patent license requests were unsuccessful—that
almost no one took a patent license. Just fifteen percent reported
that respondents always took a patent license.
Table 16
Percent of Outlicensing Requests that Led to Purchase

Interestingly, companies that outlicensed patents reported
a significantly higher rate of technology transfer associated with
their outlicenses than our respondents reported when licensing
patents from others. While nearly sixty percent conceded that
their outgoing patent licenses almost never led to technology
transfer, almost a quarter said that their licensing demands to
others always involved technology transfer.
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The difference in these proportions is statistically significant at the .05 level,124 meaning that we can reject the claim that
we would have observed a difference as great as the one observed
if there was no difference in the true proportions of knowledge
transfer with ninety-five percent certainty.
Table 17
Percent of Outlicensing Patents that Led to Knowledge Transfer

The outlicensing data confirms that most patent license demands don’t lead to technology transfer. But the disconnect between what companies reported when being on the licensor side
and what they reported on the licensee side is interesting, so we
looked further into the data. In particular, we wanted to explore
the extent to which egocentric bias might play a role.

124. Current statistical practice recommends against the use of blind statistical significance as an exact replacement for real-world significance. See supra
note 112 and accompanying text. Statistical significance is one of many potential indicators of real-world significance and we recommend considering effect
sizes and trends when reading these results.
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With egocentric bias, individuals value their own point of
view more than that of others, in part due to greater familiarity.125 In the patent context, that may operate as a form of optimism in which patent owners think they are contributing more
by licensing than licensees think they are receiving. Prior literature suggests that IP owners overvaluing their own contributions is a particular problem.126 But the bias could also move in
the other direction, with licensees minimizing the contributions
others make and overvaluing their own contributions. Whichever way the bias cuts, evidence that patentees think they are
contributing more than licensees think they are receiving could
help explain some of the difficulty the two sides have had in engaging in a constructive conversation over patent reform.127
125. Psychology literature confirms the existence of an “egocentrism” bias,
in which individuals view their own contributions as more important and the
contributions of others as less important. See, e.g., Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly,
Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 322, 323–325 (1979) (discussing four possible processes explaining
egocentrism bias).
126. Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman experimentally
showed that there is “a substantial valuation asymmetry between authors of
poems and potential purchasers of them,” suggesting that the IP owners tend
to overvalue their contributions. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4
(2010). In making this finding, Buccafusco and Sprigman draw on a rich literature in behavioral economics discussing the “endowment effect”—the notion
that people ascribe more value to things merely because they own them. See,
e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194–97 (1991); Daniel Kahneman
et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98
J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342–43 (1990) (finding evidence of an endowment effect
even when items are only possessed for a short time). Prior to Buccafusco’s and
Sprigman’s work, the endowment effect had been shown for information,
Daphne R. Raban & Sheizaf Rafaeli, The Effect of Source Nature and Status on
the Subjective Value of Information, 57 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 321,
326 (2006), which, like IP, is a nonrival good. Previous studies also showed that
people who believed that they received goods as a result of superior performance
on a test valued the goods more highly than people who obtained the same goods
by chance alone. George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence
in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 160–61 (1994).
Buccafusco and Sprigman showed, for the first time, that the endowment effect
extends to knowledge goods an owner creates. Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra,
at 4–5.
127. For examples of extreme rhetoric on both sides, compare Neal Solomon,
The Disintegration of the American Patent System, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 26,
2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/26/disintegration-american-patent
-system/id=77594 (claiming that efforts to moderate abuses are causing the “disintegration” of the U.S. patent system and threatening innovation), with Mike
Masnick, When Patents Attack: How Patents Are Destroying Innovation in Silicon Valley, TECHDIRT (July 25, 2011), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
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Thus, we wanted to determine the extent to which that form of
bias might be influencing the responses.
To be sure, there is a scenario that would explain the results
without any egocentrism bias, given two things that are evident
in the data. First, we observe limited overlap between those who
answered the licensor questions and those who answered the licensee questions. Only about twenty percent of the participants
responded that they had experience both with taking a license
when approached by others and with getting others to take a license in their own technology.
Further, if we think of success as the quality of leading to
markers of innovation such as technology transfer, there is an
uneven distribution of success among the companies who got
others to take a license from them. Moreover, that uneven distribution is much greater than among companies who took a license when approached by others. Thus, it is possible a small
number of highly successful outlicensors could cause the result
we are seeing in that category of companies, which would not be
mirrored in the category of those who took licenses when approached. If so, rather than egocentric bias, it may be that a
small number of companies have very good patents to offer for
license.
To look further at the question of egocentric bias, we focused
in on those respondents who answered both sides of the question—that is, those who reported experience on both the licensor
and licensee side. With companies having experience on both
sides of the fence, the reported markers of innovation on both
sides were considerably more similar. Although respondents reported greater markers of innovation when they licensed their
patents out to other companies than when they took a license,
the difference was only about eight percent. Thus, at least for
those who have experience on both sides, we are not seeing such
a wide margin of egocentrism.
One cannot necessarily project those results onto the respondents who reported experience with only one side of the
question. It is possible that the experience of sitting on both sides
of the fence at different times could make some respondents
more able to see the value from the other side, an experience that
the one-sided respondents would not share. Nevertheless, the
delta between the two sides appears likely to be less striking
20110724/22250715225/when-patents-attack-how-patents-are-destroying
-innovation-silicon-valley.shtml (claiming that abuses by patent trolls are destroying innovation in Silicon Valley).
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than at first glance. Most important, at the end of the day, the
outlicensing data confirms that most patent license demands
don’t lead to markers of innovation such as technology transfer.
Coupled with other evidence, that suggests there is some egocentrism bias at work.
D. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC RESULTS
Prior work has found significant differences by industry in
the functioning of the patent system.128 Our results provide further evidence for that divide. In addition to finding significant
differences between the computer and life sciences industries,
we also show that other industries have unique experiences with
patent licensing.129
In Table 18, we report the percentage of responding companies in each industry that developed a new product or modified
an existing product more than ten percent of the time in response to a licensing request from each sort of patent owner.
These results sum all the categories in our survey other than the
0–10% category. One thing that is notable is that there is much
less variation in how respondents behave when the licensor is an
operating company than in any of the other categories. For some
categories—federal labs, other—that may be an artifact of the
small number of responses, but the contrast with universities
and NPEs is particularly remarkable. In the computer industry,
not one respondent indicated that they made new or modified
products in response to a licensing demand from an NPE or a
university. By contrast, all other industries were much more responsive to university licensing requests, and most industries
were also much more responsive to NPE licensing requests.
Table 19 presents another way of looking at the same results. For this table, we added up the responses in all columns
and generated a mean percentage of times each group made or
modified a product. For instance, if five companies responded,
and four said they created a new product 0% of the time and one
said they created a new product 100% of the time, we summed

128. See sources cited supra note 11.
129. For an argument that the decision to assert patents in licensing is industry-specific, see Clark D. Asay, Patent Pacifism, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645,
667–702 (2017) (using the software, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and semiconductor industries as examples).
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the percentages so that overall, the responding companies generated new products 20% of the time.130 The results here are similar to those in Table 14. We see surprisingly little variation by
industry when responding to demands from operating companies, but quite a lot of variation in responses to NPE and university licensing demands.
The combination of NPEs and the computer industry—or,
for that matter, university ex post licensing demands and the
computer industry—seems particularly unlikely to drive product
innovation. That may be a function of the nature of the patents
asserted in those industries, the behavior of plaintiffs or defendants, or the speed with which technology moves in that industry
compared to the others we studied. Regardless of the reason, it
is an indication that patent licensing demands by NPEs may
drive product changes in some industries, but not in computers.
And it is notable that it does not seem to reflect a flat unwillingness on the part of the computer industry to deal with patents;
computer companies are willing to change products or make new
ones when faced with licensing demands from other operating
companies.

130. This assumes that each company faced the same number of licensing
assertions. That is unrealistic. But because we don’t know how many assertions
each company faced, it provides a way of looking in a single number at the impact of the dispersion of all the answers, not just isolating one set.
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Table 18
Share of Companies Generating New Products More than Ten Percent of
the Time by Industry and Patent Entity Type

Table 19
Summed Percentage of Times Companies Generated New Products by Industry and Patent Entity Type
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These differences are statistically significant for both operating companies and NPEs in most cells.
Table 20
Statistical Significance of Industry Differences for OC’s:
Chem
know: 60%

Comp
know: 85%

Energy
know: 44%

Comp
know: 85%

-25%

Energy
know: 44%

16%

41%

Life Sci
know: 81%

-21%

4%

-37%

Trans
know: 39%

21%

46%

5%

Life Sci
know: 81%

42%

For NPE’s:
Chem
know: 0%
Comp
know: 100%
Energy
know: 48%
Life Sci
know: 88%
Trans
know: 72%

Comp
know: 100%

Energy
know: 48%

-88%

12%

-40%

-72%

28%

-24%

Life Sci
know: 88%

-100%
-48%

16%

But, we emphasize that the differences are not all that
great—no industry, including life sciences, exhibits all that
much knowledge transfer or product improvement from patent
assertions.
E. RESULTS SORTED BY RESPONDENT JOB DESCRIPTION
In addition to sorting by industry, we wanted to see whether
the results differed based on whether respondents held legal or
non-legal jobs in their companies.131 Out of the 1718 respondents, only about twelve percent specified that they held legal jobs
in the company, as opposed to non-legal jobs or unspecified. Specifically, 202 respondents held legal jobs; 1384 respondents held

131. For a description of job categories in the study, see supra notes 89–91
and accompanying text (methodology section).
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non-legal jobs, and 132 were unknown. Given that the vast majority of respondents held non-legal or unspecified jobs, we analyzed the data to see if any of the results changed by looking only
at those in the legal field. The alternate sorting, however, revealed little difference, and the results were unchanged for most
questions.
The two exceptions arose in the university and out-licensing
contexts. The first variation arose with the question related to
whether patent licenses purchased from universities included a
transfer of knowledge. Recall that with the group as a whole,
universities did better than NPEs when it came to knowledge
transfer, but not by much; more than seventy percent of respondents said they almost never got knowledge from university patent licenses, while just over ten percent said they always did.
Looking at the respondents who specifically identified themselves as holding non-legal jobs, the responses were spread more
evenly. Roughly forty-three percent responded that the company
almost never received knowledge transfer from a university patent, almost thirty percent responded that the company always
received knowledge from a university patent, and the remaining
percentages were spread among the possible responses.
Those in the legal field were more pessimistic. All but one of
the respondents in the legal field said that company almost
never received knowledge transfer from a university patent. The
remaining respondent said that the company always received
knowledge transfer from a university.
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Table 21
Legal Respondents to Percent of Firms Whose Purchased University
Patents Led to Knowledge Transfer
Legal Respondents
to Percent of Firms whose Purchased University Patents Led to Knowledge Transfer
60%

6

40%

6

20%

1

0

0%

0%

1−10%

11−25%

0

0

26−50%

51−75%

All

Percent Category

The other difference between legal and non-legal respondents occurred with one of the out-licensing questions—that is,
whether their own companies made patent licensing demands of
others and how those demands fared. In this context, those with
legal jobs had a different perspective regarding whether those
approaches led to purchase of a license. Recall that over half of
the group as a whole indicated that their requests were unsuccessful—that almost no one took a patent license—and just fifteen percent reported that respondents always took a patent license.
In this case, those with legal jobs were more optimistic about
their efforts. Only one-third indicated that their efforts were almost always unsuccessful while almost twenty percent indicated
that their efforts were always successful. The remaining responses were spread among the other possible categories.132

132. Respondents who identified themselves as having non-legal jobs were
more pessimistic about this category, with almost two-thirds indicating that
their efforts were almost never successful. Only nine percent said that their efforts were always successful, and the remaining answers were spread among
the other possible categories.
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Table 22
Legal Respondents to Percent of Outlicensing Requests that Led to
Legal Respondents
Purchase
to Percent of Outlicensing Requests that Led to Pur chase

25%

8

7
20%

8
15%

4

8
6

10%

5%

1
0%

0%

1−10%

11−25%

26−50%

51−75%

76−99%

All

Percent Category

It is possible that those with legal jobs have greater
knowledge of whether efforts to sell licenses to others were successful. After all, the legal department had to negotiate those licenses. And it is possible that companies with in-house counsel
focused on IP issues are more likely to license technology that
drives innovation. It is also possible, however, that lawyers overestimated the success of their department. Nevertheless, we
should note that responses from those with legal jobs to the remaining out-licensing questions were consistent with the responses from the full group. The large majority conceding that
their outgoing licenses almost never led to technology transfer.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Our results have significant implications for our understanding of the patent system and for current debates over patent reform. Two things stand out. First, our patent system is
not monolithic. The experiences of different companies vary
along every dimension. We may have a nominally unitary patent
system, but the experiences of those who encounter that system
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are anything but unitary. Second, patent licensing demands do
not seem to drive innovation except in unusual circumstances.
That has important lessons for the debates over patent trolls and
patent reform.
A. THERE IS NO ONE RIGHT ANSWER
There is a natural tendency to generalize in policy debates
about the patent system. To many of its defenders, the patent
system is the main driver of innovation. Patents are good, so
more and stronger patents must be better, regardless of the industry, or who owns them, or what happens with them. To some
on the other side, patents themselves are an impediment to innovation. Patent litigation is associated with patent trolls who
tax innovative companies.
Our results add to a growing data-driven literature that
shows reality to be more complex.133
We begin with the patent troll problem. Underlying the debate over the social harm caused by patent trolls is debate over
who constitutes a patent troll. For some, any NPE is a troll; for
others, the definition is more limited, covering only companies
in the business of buying patents to assert them (patent assertion entities or PAEs) or an even narrower group that asserts
only bad patents.134 Prior work has shown that some NPEs, particularly universities and startups, do much better in court than
133. For other work in that vein, see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 18;
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 11; John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (2015).
134. Some commentators appear to label all NPE’s as patent trolls. See
James Bessen, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls
-do-hurt-innovation (defining patent trolls as “firms that make their money asserting patents against other companies, but do not make a useful product of
their own”); Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 4, at 426 (“Some pejoratively refer
to some or all NPEs as ‘patent trolls,’ analogizing that these patent holders wait
until another brings a product to market and then jump from under the bridge
to demand a toll.”). This is essentially the definition given to patent trolls by
Peter Detkin, the man generally credited with coining the term “patent troll.”
Roger Kay, Where Did the Patent Troll Narrative Come From?, MEDIUM (Feb.
12, 2018), https://medium.com/@rogerkay/where-did-the-patent-troll-narrative
-come-from-301b20072dac (defining patent trolls as “somebody who tries to
make a lot of money from a patent that they are not practicing, have no intention of practicing, and in most cases never practiced”). Others define trolls more
narrowly, as encompassing only those who buy patents from others rather than
inventing themselves (what we call PAEs), or, alternatively, limiting the term
to the assertion of weak patents. Other commentators believe we should get rid
of the term troll altogether. See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 5, at 200–01 (preferring the term “patent dealer[ ] ” to patent troll in all cases).
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others, particularly PAEs.135 Our data suggests that NPEs are
not a monolithic group when it comes to patent licensing demands either. We defined NPEs in our study as entities or individuals whose core activity involves litigating or licensing patents, a broader definition than PAEs because it includes
companies in the business of asserting patents developed inhouse but narrower than some definitions, putting groups like

Most scholars appear to fall somewhere in-between. Many believe that patent trolls are characterized by those NPEs that wait to assert their patents
until after operating companies have already adopted the technology so that the
trolls can attempt to charge excessive rents. See, e.g., Timo Fischer & Joachim
Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology – An Empirical Analysis of
NPEs’ Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL’Y 1519, 1520 (2012) (defining patent
trolls as “firms that seek to generate profits” primarily from licensing patented
technology to firms only after the firms are infringing the patent and pressured
to reach a license agreement); Damien Geradin et al., Elves or Trolls? The Role
of Nonpracticing Patent Owners in the Innovation Economy, 21 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 73, 74–75 (2011) (defining patent trolls as “those entities licensing
their patents opportunistically ex post,” thereby “prey[ing] upon manufacturers
and other downstream firms by charging ‘supra-competitive’ rates for their patents”); Lemley, supra note 10, at 630 (arguing that we should abandon the
search for companies to call patent trolls and instead modify legal rules to
thwart socially suboptimal troll-like behavior: “the capture by patent owners of
a disproportionate share of an irreversible investment.”); Patent Trolls,
EFF.ORG, https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019) (“A patent troll uses patents as legal weapons, instead of actually
creating any new products or coming up with new ideas. Instead, trolls are in
the business of litigation (or even just threatening litigation).”). Still others define patent trolls as those companies that assert patents in “bad faith,” which
may include the assertion of low-quality patents. See, e.g., Marc Morgan, Stop
Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who
Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. BUS. J. 165, 178 (2008) (“Under a bad faith definition patent trolls could fall into three categories: (1) parties
who try to hide owning a patent until a company unsuspectingly infringes it,
waiting until the company has expended significant resources so that they can
extract a settlement; (2) parties that acquire large patent portfolios solely for
the offensive purpose of putting competitors out of business; and (3) parties who
intentionally acquire low quality patents in order to enforce them against companies, hoping to receive a settlement because the companies want to avoid the
high discovery costs.”).
135. Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 270–71 fig.5, tbl.6(a);
Michael Risch, The Layered Patent System, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1544–47
(2016).
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universities and federal labs in a different category.136 NPEs under that definition almost never generate new products or
knowledge transfer when they license their patents.137
By contrast, the results for certain types of NPEs were more
promising. Federal labs that assert patents are the group most
likely to transfer knowledge or drive new products when they
license patents, though the small number of instances in which
federal labs asserted patents makes the data of questionable significance.138 Interestingly, those federal labs are the ones that
depend least on patents themselves as drivers of licensing.139 So
while their licensing may be driving innovation among licensees,
it is not clear that the federal lab needs the incentive of patents
to drive that innovation. The results for universities are more
mixed. University patent demands are more likely to drive innovation than demands by other sorts of NPEs, but most of them
still don’t involve any indicia of technology transfer.140 That is
consistent with the hybrid role university patenting plays. Sometimes university patents are in fact responsible for spinning new
technologies out to the private sector. But at other times universities act as patent trolls, not disseminating new inventions but
suing those who develop those inventions independently.141
Second, our results confirm prior literature that finds that
the patent system works differently in different industries.142
Patent licensing demands almost never result in technology
transfer or innovation in the computer industry, particularly
136. See supra Part II.C.1. We asked about interactions with the following
groups:
Companies whose core activity is producing a product or service (i.e., operating companies)
Entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating
patents (i.e., NPEs)
Universities, faculty, or other individuals at universities
Federal labs, federal facilities, federal research centers, and other federal
government sources (i.e., Department of Energy national labs, NASA research
centers, NIH centers or institutes)
Other, please specify.
137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
141. See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole
Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 274 (2017) (providing an example of Boston
University suing tech giants for patent infringing); cf. Lemley, supra note 10, at
629 (stating that although universities are not trolls, they share some characteristics with trolls).
142. See sources cited supra note 11.
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when NPEs are doing the asserting. They are somewhat more
likely to be productive in the life sciences, but there aren’t that
many NPEs in those industries to begin with. Interestingly,
there is less variation than we might have expected when it
comes to operating company licensing demands. Patent licensing
demands by operating companies in the computer industry were
almost as likely as those in the life science industry to lead to
new or modified products or knowledge transfer. So much of the
computer versus life sciences divide does seem to be driven by
the different prevalence and role of NPEs in the two industries.
A related finding regarding the industry differences is that
the industry variation we observe doesn’t map neatly to the traditional life sciences versus computer divide we have seen in the
last decades of patent reform debates.143 Instead, it is areas like
energy and transportation that see the most new products resulting from at least some kinds of patent licensing demands.144 That suggests both that patent policy experts and advocates on both sides need to acknowledge the reality of industry
differences, but also need to look beyond the one-dimensional debate between computer and life sciences firms, just as we need
to look beyond the single dimension of operating companies versus NPEs.
A third way in which the patent system seems differentiated
has to do with whether the responding firm is acting as a licensor
or a licensee. When we asked firms about the licensing of their
own patents rather than licensing patents from others, we got a
different story. Companies think their own patents drive innovation by others somewhat more than they think others’ patents
drive their own innovation. While it is possible that the firms we
surveyed happened to transfer more technology out with their
patents than they receive from other firms’ patents, we suspect
that the survey responses show some bias. This could be bias in
either direction, though we think the most likely explanation is
optimism bias: patentees think they are generating more innovation than licensees think they are.145 Whichever way the skew
cuts, this result also helps explain the very different perceptions
of the patent system by patentees and defendants. They really
143. See supra note 12.
144. See supra tbl.20.
145. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 126, at 28–30 (showing that
creators are wildly optimistic when it comes to valuing their own contributions,
suggesting that patent licensors may think they are contributing more to the
world than they are).
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do seem to see their contributions to the world differently. And
that in turn makes it harder for parties to come to terms. It may
not be simply that one side or the other is being greedy and demanding too much; they may each see their position as reasonable given the different assessment they place on the contribution
of the patent to the licensee’s product.
Finally, and perhaps most important in the long run, companies differ in whether they interact with the patent system at
all. A significant majority of respondents in our study (seventyfive percent) simply didn’t face patent licensing demands at
all.146 That number may be even higher, since many of the companies that did not respond may have done so because they
didn’t think the survey pertained to them. It is true that the companies that have never faced patent licensing demands may be
smaller and less innovative than the ones that do face licensing
demands. And the fact that they didn’t face patent licensing demands doesn’t mean these companies had no interaction at all
with the patent system. They might have their own patents, and
they might enter into mergers or other business transactions
that include patents. But given the raging debates over the patent system and its role in driving the economy, it is important
to recognize that there are large swaths of American business
that simply don’t deal with patent licensing demands at all.
B. PATENT LICENSING DEMANDS DON’T DRIVE INNOVATION
The full survey of U.S. businesses validates and extends our
initial result that NPE licensing demands almost never lead to
innovation by the target firm.147 None of the indicia we would
expect of real technology transfer were common in patent licensing demands, no matter who made those demands, but NPE demands were particularly unlikely to be accompanied by the sharing of know-how or employees, the creation of joint ventures, or
the development of new products.148
To be clear, our data do not suggest—and we do not believe—that the patent system as a whole doesn’t matter or isn’t
working. Patent acquisition and patent licensing remain important parts of the innovation ecosystem, particularly for practicing companies. Patent enforcement too can promote innovation by giving operating companies exclusivity. But our study
146. See supra Part III.A.
147. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 139, 155–73 (discussing the results
of the pilot survey).
148. See Lemley & Feldman, Efficient, supra note 6.
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does belie claims that the patent enforcement system is itself a
driver of innovation. It isn’t.
That provides important evidence for the ongoing debate
over patent trolls and patent reform. Patents and patent licenses
aren’t inherent goods in and of themselves. They are valuable
if—but only if—they generate innovation or knowledge the world
wouldn’t otherwise have.149 The traditional theory of patents is
that they promote innovation by insulating their owners from
competition, encouraging investment in invention to obtain that
benefit.150 But that traditional theory benefits only companies
that actually make products and compete in the marketplace. An
inventor who doesn’t actually sell products doesn’t benefit directly from the traditional justification for patents.
NPEs can nonetheless benefit from the patent system in
ways that also benefit society. The exclusivity patents provide
can be traded for money, and the prospect of that money may
drive new innovation by those NPEs. The case for those who
didn’t themselves invent anything, but bought patents for others, is less straightforward. The incentive story there depends on
the revenue they pay to inventors in exchange for the patent.151
But unlike operating companies, who turn that new innovation
into products that benefit the world, NPEs must find some way
of sharing their innovations with the world if society is to benefit.
The traditional way we expect that sharing of knowledge is
through the patent instrument itself. Because patents must
teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the
invention,152 NPEs in theory can invent something and teach
others how to do it by the mere act of writing and publishing a
patent. Unfortunately, that rarely works as hoped. The combination of a slow patent examination process, artful drafting by
patent owners, and fast-moving technologies mean that in most
industries reading patents is not a productive way of advancing
scientific knowledge.153 And while describing the invention in a
patent could in some cases advance knowledge, the evidence suggests that very few companies accused of infringement actually
149. See Burstein, supra note 40, at 514–20 (discussing patents as not inherently valuable); Lemley & Feldman, Efficient, supra note 6 (discussing patent
innovation and value).
150. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 319–26; Lemley, supra note
36, at 993–96 (discussing the incentive theory of patents).
151. There is reason to believe PAEs pass relatively little of their revenue on
to actual inventors. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 410–11.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
153. See supra note 122.
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learned about the invention from the patentee, directly or indirectly. Rather, in over ninety percent of cases they independently
invented the same thing.154 That doesn’t prevent them from being sued; unlike copyright155 and trade secret law,156 independent invention is not a defense to patent infringement.157 True,
some people learn an invention by reading patents. And if they
do, the patent has contributed to society. That is true whether
the learner pays a license to use the patent or copies the invention without paying. The world has benefited from the invention;
enforcement of the patent in that case ensures that the inventor
who contributed something to the world (albeit by proxy) gets
paid for their contribution. Patent licensing in this case is good
for the world, but only because the licensee got the invention

154. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1424 (showing little evidence
of copying despite significant incentives and ability to prove copying if it exists).
But see Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability
in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (2016) (asserting that Cotropia’s
and Lemley’s estimate may be too low “[b]ecause lawyers do not have to establish copying affirmatively, they seldom bother to try”); Sichelman, supra note
11, at 544–45 n.143 (arguing that Cotropia’s and Lemley’s estimate may be too
low because (1) product copying is more common than patent copying, and product copying is “unlikely to find its way into the kinds of litigation documents
Cotropia and Lemley examined;” and (2) evidence of copying is typically
“scant”). Both Merges and Sichelman understate the incentives of trial lawyers
to demonstrate copying if it exists.
155. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 476–82 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing copying requirement);
see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946) (same). Some
circuits allow copying to be established by a “striking similarity” between the
protected work and infringing works, even if there is no evidence that the alleged infringer had any access to the copyrighted work. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863
F.2d 1061, 1067–68 (2d Cir. 1988). But see Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th
Cir. 1984) (requiring proof of access even with a finding of striking similarity).
Under such a test, one might argue that copying is not practically required to
establish copyright infringement in all cases. However, the rationale for relying
solely on striking similarity is that such evidence “preclude[s] the possibility of
independent creation.” Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978).
Thus, copying is still established by inference.
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (AM. LAW
INST. 1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 CMT. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985)
(“Proper means include . . . [d]iscovery by independent invention . . . .”).
157. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1423; see also Lemley, supra note
47, at 1525 (acknowledging Samson Vermont’s proposition that independent invention should be a defense, but noting that it currently isn’t); Stephen M.
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002) (“Perhaps the most basic difference between patents and other intellectual property such as trade secrets and
copyright is that independent invention is not a defence to infringement.”).
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from the patent and we want to encourage the acquisition of that
knowledge to happen through markets rather than illegally.
Alternatively, NPEs can transfer knowledge directly to operating companies that incorporate it into a product. Sometimes
the operating companies do so by acquiring the NPE.158 This is
the theoretical basis for patent licensing—I give you the right to
use an invention in exchange for money.159 But here too a patent
license benefits the world only if the licensing transaction actually gives new knowledge to the licensee. If it doesn’t, the licensee is paying the patent owner for the right to use something the
licensee itself invented independently. True, an inventor is likely
to get paid (though less likely if the immediate beneficiary is an
intermediary like a PAE). But another inventor is the one paying, and that second inventor is the one actually sharing the invention with the world. And since that second inventor by hypothesis didn’t learn anything from the first, it’s hard to see why
we would build a system to encourage that wealth transfer, especially one as costly as our patent enforcement system.160
Patentees can benefit the world by making new products or
by giving the world information they didn’t have that others can
use to make new products. But if neither of those things is true,
patent enforcement and licensing looks like an unproductive

158. For discussions of vertical integration and acquisition as a means of
technology transfer, see, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a
Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (2011); John F. Coyle & Greg D.
Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281 (2013); Peter Lee, Innovation and the
Firm: A New Synthesis, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (2018).
159. Empirical evidence shows that patent licenses associated with knowhow command higher rates than licenses for patents alone. Gaurav Kankanhalli
& Alan Kwan, An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining Power in Licensing Contract Terms 12 (Aug. 1, 2018) (unpublished paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171920.
160. See supra note 4. Michael Risch argues that we should put up with the
social waste of ex post licensing absent technology transfer because without the
threat of that sort of enforcement we wouldn’t see ex ante licensing with technology transfer. Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 979, 981 (2014). Perhaps. But there seem to be good reasons for companies
on all sides to engage in real technology transfer without the threat of a lawsuit
if they don’t. The entities we found to be most successful at technology transfer—federal labs and universities—are the ones who are least likely to file patent lawsuits. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. Companies negotiate technology transfer licenses without IP in many different circumstances.
Burstein, supra note 40, at 514–20. And there is some reason to believe that the
prevalence of NPE assertions against independent inventors makes it harder
for start-ups to engage in technology transfer by encouraging potential licensees
to avoid anyone with patents. See Lemley, supra note 122, at 32–33.
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wealth transfer, not a benefit to society.161 The most significant
finding of our study is that patent licensing demands by NPEs
almost never seem to involve knowledge transfer. That doesn’t
mean NPEs are always a burden on society. They occasionally
transfer knowledge, and sometimes their inventions are copied.
But it does indicate that they aren’t often transferring
knowledge or promoting innovation through patent licensing demands. Coupled with evidence that there is very little copying of
patents in the industries NPEs frequent162 and evidence that
NPEs tend to assert patents at the end of their lives, well after
any learning seems plausible,163 that means we should be quite
skeptical of claims that NPEs are serving as efficient middlemen
and promoting innovation.
CONCLUSION
This is the first comprehensive study of how American businesses respond to patent licensing demands. The picture it
paints is complex. Patent licensing is not a unitary phenomenon.
It differs by the type of patentee, by industry, and by responding
company. But one thing does stand out in the results: patent licensing by NPEs doesn’t seem to promote innovation, knowledge
transfer, or the development of new products. NPEs—the entities responsible for most patent litigation in the United States in
recent years—don’t seem to be contributing to society by licensing their patents.

161. Some would conclude that the problem is that patent law applies to independent invention at all. Independent inventors, after all, didn’t benefit from
access to the patent or the patented technology. See Carl Shapiro, Prior User
Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92, 92 (2006) (discussing the inability for independent inventors to use an independent invention defense); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475,
483–84 (2006) (discussing user rights and different rights afforded to the first
and second investor). We wouldn’t go that far. Patentees who provide technology
to the world at large can provide a social benefit even if the defendant didn’t
obtain that benefit, and encouraging that technology transfer might require a
patent right that forbids even independent invention. See Lemley, supra note
47, at 1532.
162. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1423–24 (finding copying only occurred in 1.76% of cases in the study).
163. See supra note 28.
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTION TREE164
<PATENT>
In the last THREE years, has your company received patent licensing requests? These could be calls or letters from another party
suggesting patents in which you may be interested, offering to license patents to you, asserting a patent or threatening litigation,
giving notice of intent to file an infringement lawsuit, or noticing
the filing of an actual infringement lawsuit.
<1> Yes
<2> No
[DISPLAY IFF <PATENT> ≤1.]
<GUESS>
Some questions in this survey ask for frequency counts or percentages. Please feel free to answer simply using your best estimate
or approximation.
[PAGE BREAK]
[DISPLAY IF <PATENT> ≤1.]
<FREQP>
On average over the past THREE years, how often has your
company received patent licensing requests?
<1> Less than once a year
<2> 1-5 times per year
<3> 6-10 times per year
<4> 11-50 times per year
<5> More than 50 times per year
<SOURCE>
What parties initiated these requests? Please select all that
apply.
<1> Companies whose core activity is producing a product
or service (i.e., operating companies)
<2> Entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents (i.e., NPEs)
<3> Universities, faculty, or other individuals at universities
<4> Federal labs, federal facilities, federal research centers, and
other federal government sources (i.e., Department of Energy national labs, NASA research centers, NIH centers or institutes)

164. Note that not all respondents encountered every question. The survey
they saw depended on previous answers they had given.
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<5> Other, please specify: [ENTER SHORT TEXT; FORCE
TEXT RESPONSE IF SELECTED]
[DISPLAY IFF AT LEAST ONE RESPONSE IS SELECTED IN <SOURCE>.]
<PERCENTR>
Indicate below the approximate percentage of the requests that
came from each source. Please give a best estimation. Note that the
total below should sum to 100%.
[DISPLAY RESPONSE CHOICE(S) IFF SELECTED IN
<SOURCE>.]
<1> Companies whose core activity is producing a product
or service: [ENTER NUMERIC TEXT]
<2> Entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents
<3> Universities, faculty, or other individuals at universities: [ENTER NUMERIC TEXT]
<4> Federal labs, facilities, or research centers: [ENTER
NUMERIC TEXT]
<5> {PIPED-IN TEXT FROM SOURCE=4}: [ENTER NUMERIC
TEXT]
[DISPLAY NEXT SERIES IFF SOURCE=1 IS SELECTED.]
<OC>
Please think about patent licensing requests from companies whose
core activity is producing a product or service (i.e., operating companies)
in the last three years.
Approximately what portion of such requests led your company
to take a patent license? Please feel free to answer with your best approximation, here and throughout the survey.
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OC≥2.]
<OCNEW>
Of these requests from operating companies that led to a patent
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license, approximately what portion resulted in your company creating new products or features with the technology you licensed (e.g.,
as opposed to merely taking the license to cover existing products
or features)?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OC≥2.]
<OCTRANSF>
Of these requests from operating companies that led to a patent
license, approximately what portion resulted in the operating company transferring technical knowledge, personnel (e.g., through a
consulting agreement), or creating a joint venture with your company in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
[DISPLAY NEXT SERIES IFF SOURCE=2 IS SELECTED.]
<NPE>
Please think about patent licensing requests from entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents (i.e.,
NPEs) in the last three years.
Approximately what portion of such requests led your company to take a patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
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<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF NPE≥2.]
<NPENEW>
Of these requests from non-practicing entities that led to a patent license, approximately what portion resulted in your company
creating new products or features with the technology you licensed
(e.g., as opposed to merely taking the license to cover existing products or features)?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF NPE≥2.]
<NPETRANSF>
Of these requests from non-practicing entities that led to a patent license, approximately what portion resulted in the NPE transferring technical knowledge, personnel (e.g., through a consulting
agreement), or creating a joint venture with your company in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
[DISPLAY NEXT SERIES IFF SOURCE=3 IS SELECTED.]
<UNI>
Please think about patent licensing requests from universities, faculty, or other individuals at universities in the last three years.
Approximately what portion of such requests led your company to take a patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
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<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF UNI≥2.]
<UNINEW>
Of these requests from universities that led to a patent license,
approximately what portion resulted in your company creating new
products or features with the technology you licensed (e.g., as opposed
to merely taking the license to cover existing products or features)?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF UNI≥2.]
<UNITRANSF>
Of these requests from universities that led to a patent license,
approximately what portion resulted in the university or individual
at the university transferring technical knowledge, personnel (e.g.,
through a consulting agreement), or creating a joint venture with
your company in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
[DISPLAY NEXT SERIES IFF SOURCE=4 IS SELECTED.]
<FED>
Please think about patent licensing requests from federal labs, federal facilities, federal research centers, and other federal government
sources in the last three years. Some examples of federal government
sources include Department of Energy national labs, NASA research centers, and NIH centers or institutes.
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Approximately what portion of such requests led your company to take a patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF FED≥2.]
<FEDNEW>
Of these requests from federal entities that led to a patent license, approximately what portion resulted in your company creating new products or features with the technology you licensed (e.g., as
opposed to merely taking the license to cover existing products or
features)?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF FED≥2.]
<FEDTRANSF>
Of these requests from federal entities that led to a patent license, approximately what portion resulted in the federal lab, facility, or research center transferring technical knowledge, personnel
(e.g., through a consulting agreement), or creating a joint venture
with your company in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
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[DISPLAY NEXT SERIES IFF SOURCE=5 IS SELECTED.]
<OTHER>
Please think about patent licensing requests from {PIPED-IN TEXT
RESPONSE FROM <SOURCE>} in the last three years.
Approximately what portion of such requests led your company to take a patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OTHER≥2.]
<OTHERNEW>
Of these requests from {PIPED-IN TEXT RESPONSE FROM
<SOURCE>} that led to a patent license, approximately what portion
resulted in you creating new products or features with the technology
you licensed (e.g., as opposed to merely taking the license to cover
existing products or features)?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OTHER≥2.]
<OTHERTRANSF>
Of these requests from {PIPED-IN TEXT RESPONSE FROM
<SOURCE>} that led to a patent license, approximately what portion
resulted in the {PIPED-IN TEXT} transferring technical
knowledge, personnel (e.g., through a consulting agreement), or
creating a joint venture with your company in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
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<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
Please transition to thinking about out-licensing requests
your company may have made in the last three years. These are
circumstances in which your company holds the patent and it is
your company that approaches an outside party to request they
take a patent license from you.
<OUTL>
In the last THREE years, has your company approached another
party to request that the other company take a patent license from
you?
<1> Yes
<2> No
[DISPLAY IFF OUTL=1.]
<FREQO>
On average over the past THREE years, how often has your
company made such patent licensing requests?
<1> Less than once a year
<2> 1-5 times per year
<3> 6-10 times per year
<4> 11-50 times per year
<5> More than 50 times per year
[DISPLAY IFF OUTL=1.]
<SOURCEO>
To which parties did your company make these requests to take a
patent license from you? Please select all that apply.
<1> Companies whose core activity is producing a product
or service (i.e., operating companies)
<2> Entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents (i.e., NPEs)
<3> Universities, faculty, or other individuals at universities
<4> Federal labs, facilities, or research centers (i.e., Department
of Energy national labs, NASA research centers, NIH centers or institutes)
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<5> Other, please specify: [ENTER SHORT TEXT; FORCE
TEXT RESPONSE IF SELECTED]
[DISPLAY IFF SOURCEO=1 IS SELECTED.]
<OOC2>
Of the requests your company made to an operating company
asking them to take a patent license from you, approximately what
portion led that company to take a patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OOC2≥2.]
<OOCTRANS>
Of these out-licensing requests that led to a patent license, approximately what portion resulted in your company transferring
technical knowledge, personnel (e.g., through a consulting agreement), or creating a joint venture with the other company in addition to granting a patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
Now please think about interactions your company has had
with universities, faculty, or other individuals at universities in
the past three years.
<OUNIP>
In the last THREE years, has your company approached or been
approached by a university suggesting a research project prior to the
patenting stage?
<1> Yes
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<2> No
<3> Don’t Know
[DISPLAY IFF OUNIP=1]
<OUNIPFREQ>
Of those encounters between your company and a university
that resulted in a joint project, approximately what portion of them
resulted in patents?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OUNIPFREQ≥2]
<OUNIPNEW>
Of those encounters between your company and a university
that resulted in a joint project from which your company licensed the
patents, approximately what portion of them resulted in your company creating new products or features with the technology you licensed?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OUNIPFREQ≥2]
<OUNIPTRANSF>
Of those encounters between your company and a university
that resulted in a joint project from which your company licensed
the patents, approximately what portion of them resulted in the university transferring technical knowledge or personnel (e.g.,
through a consulting agreement) in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
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<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[PAGE BREAK]
Now please think about interactions your company has had
with federal labs, federal facilities, federal research centers, and
other federal government sources in the last three years. As
noted earlier, some examples of federal government sources include Department of Energy national labs, NASA research centers, and NIH centers or institutes.
<OFEDP>
In the last THREE years, has your company approached or been
approached by a federal lab, facility, or research center suggesting a
research project prior to the patenting stage?
<1> Yes
<2> No
<3> Don’t Know
[DISPLAY IFF OFEDP=1]
<OFEDPFREQ>
Of those encounters between your company and a federal entity
that resulted in a joint project, approximately what portion of them
resulted in patents?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OFEDPFREQ≥2]
<OFEDPNEW>
Of those encounters between your company and a federal entity that resulted in a joint project from which your company licensed the patents, approximately what portion of them resulted in
your company creating new products or features with the technology you licensed?
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<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6> 76-99%
<7> All
[DISPLAY IFF OFEDPFREQ≥2]
<OFEDPTRANSF>
Of those encounters between your company and a federal entity that resulted in a joint project from which your company licensed the patents, approximately what portion of them resulted in
the federal entity transferring technical knowledge or personnel
(e.g., through a consulting agreement) in addition to the patent license?
<1> None
<2> 1-10%
<3> 11-25%
<4> 26-50%
<5> 51-75%
<6>76-99%
<7>All
[PAGE BREAK]
This final set of questions is for demographic purposes and is only intended for analyses in the aggregate, to give us a better sense of the business landscape.
<JOB>
Which of the following best describes your job position in
your company?
<1> Counsel for patent or intellectual property
<2> Counsel for other specialized area
<3> General counsel
<4> Operations manager
<5> Director or other senior management (non-legal)
<6> CEO, owner, or other executive management (non-legal)
<7> Other, please specify: [ENTER TEXT]
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<INDUSTRY>
What is your company’s primary business sector?
<1> Information technology, computers, and related fields (including other electronics, software, communications, and semiconductors)
<2> Chemistry (excluding life sciences)
<3> Energy
<4> Life sciences (including pharmaceutical, biotechnology,
medical devices, methods, or other medical)
<5> Transportation
<6> Other, please specify: [ENTER TEXT]
<HQ>
Where is your company headquartered?
[DROPDOWN MENU RESPONSE CHOICES]
<1>Alabama
<2>Alaska
<3>Arizona
<4>Arkansas
<5>California (No.)
<6>California (So.)
<7>Colorado
<8>Connecticut
<9>Delaware
<10>District of Columbia
<11>Florida
<12>Georgia
<13>Hawaii
<14>Idaho
<15>Illinois
<16>Indiana
<17>Iowa
<18>Kansas
<19>Kentucky
<20>Louisiana
<21>Maine
<22>Maryland
<23>Massachusetts
<24>Michigan
<25>Minnesota
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<26>Mississippi
<27>Missouri
<28>Montana
<29>Nebraska
<30>Nevada
<31>New Hampshire
<32>New Jersey
<33>New Mexico
<34>New York
<35>North Carolina
<36>North Dakota
<37>Ohio
<38>Oklahoma
<39>Oregon
<40>Pennsylvania
<41>Rhode Island
<42>South Carolina
<43>South Dakota
<44>Tennessee
<45>Texas
<46>Utah
<47>Vermont
<48>Virginia
<49>Washington
<50>West Virginia
<51>Wisconsin
<52>Wyoming
<REVENUE>
What is your company’s annual revenue? Please note that all survey data are anonymous and analyzed in the aggregate only. No response will be associated with individual respondents.
<1> Less than $5 Million
<2> $6 Million - $10 Million
<3> $11 Million - $50 Million
<4> $51 Million - $100 Million
<5> More than $100 Million
[PAGE BREAK]
<COMM>
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If you would like to elaborate on your answers to any of the questions from the survey, please add your comments here: [ENTER
LONG TEXT]
[PAGE BREAK]
<CONTACT>
If you would like a report of the study findings or other information once the study concludes, please enter your name and
email address below.
Please note that all survey data are anonymous and your contact
information will not be associated with individual survey responses.
FIRST NAME: [ENTER TEXT]
LAST NAME: [ENTER TEXT]
EMAIL ADDRESS: [ENTER TEXT, EMAIL VALIDATION]

